Against Koffi Anan’s (the UN Secretary General at the time) better judgement, yet at the insistence of the US, and to save Ethiopia from a protracted war of attrition, the African Union (AU) got involved in Somalia as a Peace enforcer.1 To offer compensation to the AU, and give the occupation a legal or humanitarian justification, the US, the EU, and the UN offered support to the AU to establish the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).2 Beginning in 2007, AMISOM was presented in mainstream media and academic literature as the salvation of Somalia,3 but was stalemated in 2017 in its war with Al-Shabaab that it was meant to decimate. AMISOM’s (now African Transition Mission in Somalia – ATMIS) operations will wind down in December 2024 with Al-Shabaab still controlling much of South-central Somalia. What, then, was the essence of AMISOM these past eighteen years? What has been the achievements of the AU, Somalia, and Africa since then?

It is difficult to imagine that an exit strategy was neither prepared nor the AU advised to engage in negotiations with Al-Shabaab much earlier, when the AU had the leverage by being in control of Mogadishu. AMISOM’s control over Mogadishu, the capital, was enough grounds to engage Al-Shabaab in negotiations for future peace in Somalia. Some critics hold the view that the AU opted to advance the interests of the US and Ethiopia, for as noted by Koffi Anan,  the AU was drafted to protect Ethiopia’s interest at the expense of a truly stable Somalia.4 In steering its course, the AU ignored two major lessons of history. Firstly, indigenous rebel groups backed by the people would likely win in a long-drawn war of attrition; and secondly, external interference aimed at forceful regime change leaves states unstable in the long run.5

Mainstream Western media mostly portrayed Al-Shabaab as terrorists whose aim was to perpetuate instability in Somalia and threaten international security.6 This is somewhat similar to the case of Libya, where the international media largely remained silent on the achievements of Muammar Ghaddafi and his plans to rid Africa of the yoke of the US dollar dominance, while painting him as a brutal dictator to justify NATO’s intervention and his eventual overthrow.7 Critics have also accused mainstream media of being selective with their coverage on Al-Shabaab, such as reports not mentioning that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had evolved out of Somalia’s indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, and successfully bringing stability to Somalia’s war-torn south-central areas before being pushed out by US-backed Ethiopian forces. The websites of mainstream media houses, like CNN and BBC, fail to mention  that Al-Shabaab was the Youth Wing, and the enforcers of the decisions of the ICU.8 To justify external interference in Somalia’s affairs, the Ethiopian-backed Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) alleged that the ICU had strong links with Al-Qaeda. The forceful eviction of the ICU from power was a contributory factor in the radicalisation of Al-Shabaab.9

Currently, ATMIS is pulling out in December 2024 with no peace achieved after 18 devastating years of war.10 If the AU had leveraged its experiences and whatever advantage it had in the past 18 years, it could have facilitated a peace deal between Al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) instead of promoting Ethiopian/US interests. AMISOM being a part of this process could have brought its influence in de-radicalising Al-Shabaab. Many prior pro-ATMIS experts are sceptical of the ability of the SNA to hold out when the former pulls out.11 There is no doubt that the war has taken its toll on Al-Shabaab, as several clan groups have challenged its authority and pulled out of the group. Also, many civilians sympathetic to Al-Shabaab in the past have become disillusioned due to the indiscriminate attacks on civilians by both FGS and Al-Shabaab forces. With these divisions, south-central Somalia faces a high risk of degenerating into a theatre for intense chaos once again.12

The crises and the heavy loss of lives13 would have been averted if the AU had adopted an Africa-centered approach and supported the ICU, prevented the Ethiopian invasion, or engaged early enough with Al-Shabaab to adopt a more moderate or conciliatory approach. Now 18 years have come and gone without making any progress on the peace front. As it stands, the signs suggest that Somalis should prepare for worse times ahead. Without a clear path to homegrown peace, Somalia and Africa have much to lose, but the external actors have nothing to lose.

Endnotes

  1. Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (2007): 151, Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges, FOI, Swedish Defense Research Agency, October 17-18 (2008).  Available at: https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R–2596–SE;
  2. Catherine Harris and K.McBride, Conflict in the Horn: Somalia’s Civil War (2010). Available at: www.usfca.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=4294973603, Robrecht Deforche, “Stabilisation and Common Identity: Reflections on the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Itihaad,” Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 13: 102 (2013).
  3. Walter Lotze and Paul Williams,  The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU’s Experience in Somalia. International Peace Institute, May 9 (2016). Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/IPI-Rpt-Surge-to-Stabilize.pdf, Henok Getachew, The Post-African Union Transition Mission in Somalia and its Regional Security Implications. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, July 30 (2024). Available at: https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/07/30/the-post-african-union-transition-mission-in-somalia-and-its-regional-security-implications/#:~: text=AMISOM%20and%20the%20Subsequent%20Reconfiguration%20into%20ATMIS&text=Shortly%20after%2C%20t
  4. Barnes and Hassan, “The Rise and Fall,” 153.
  5. Ben Denison, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Failure of Regime-Change Operations. CATO Institute, January 6 (2020). Available at: https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/more-things-change-more-they-stay-same-failure-regime-change-operations
  6. Mohammed Adow, Somali fighters undeterred.  Al Jazeera, January 27 (2009). Available at : https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/1/27/somali-fighters-undeterred, Claire Klobucista, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie, Al-Shabab. Council on Foreign Relations, May 19 (2021). Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab
  7. Roy Geeenslade, Gaddafi’s Death – “How the Papers Covered it, and what they Say….” The Guardian, October 21 (2011). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ media/ greenslade/2011/oct/21/muammar-gaddafi-national-newspapers, Yuval Karniel, Amit Lavie-Dinur, and Tal Azran, Broadcast Coverage of Gaddafi’s Final Hours in Images and Headlines: A Brutal Lynch or the Desired Death of a Terrorist? The International Communication Gazette, 77(2): 171-188 (2015). DOI: 10.1177/1748048514562686, Christopher Davidson, Why was Muammar Qadhafi really removed? Middle East Policy, 24(4): 91-116 (2017). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12310, Ellen Brown, Why they killed Gaddafi: Colonialism is Alive and Well in Central Banking. IAI News, February 19 (2021). Available at: https://iai.tv/articles/why-they-killed-gaddafi-auid-1757
  8. BBC, Who are Somalia’s al-Shabaab, December, 22 (2017) Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689, BBC, Somalia Profile – Timeline. January 4 (2018). Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632; CNN is mute on the ICU, but only discusses Al-Shaabab in terms of militant attacks.
  9. Jude Cocodia, ‘Rejecting African Solutions to African Problems: The African Union and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia.’ African Security. 14 (2021). Available at: https://www.tandfonline. com/eprint/IJ7XJ5SJFSSVAPXPMHR7/full?target=10.1080/19392206.2021.1922026, Jude Cocodia, Complex Solutions to Local Problems: Constructed Narratives and External Intervention in Somalia’s Crisis. London: Anthem Press (2024).
  10. Noé Hochet-Bodin, In Somalia, Plans to Withdraw African Union Troops Raise Fears of a Security Vacuum. Le Monde, October 26 (2023). Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/26/in-somalia-plans-to-withdraw-african-union-troops-raise-fears-of-a-security-vacuum_6205591_4.html, ACLED, Special Report: Kenya-Somalia Border: Rising al=Shabaab Threat in the Wake of ATMIS Drawdown. September 1 (2023). Available at: https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/, The East African, As ATMIS Exit, Al Shabaab Creates Deadly Pan-East African Force. June 30 (2024). Available at: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/al-shabaab-creates-deadly-pan-east-african-force-4673664, Jeff Otieno, Drawdown Drama: Somalia Faces Critical Security Challenges as AU-UN Peacekeepers Prepare to Exit. The Africa Report, May 15 (2024). Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/347986/somalia-faces-critical-security-challenges-as-au-un-peacekeepers-prepare-to-exit/
  11. Paul Williams, The Somali National Army Versus Al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment. CTC Sentinel, 17(4), April (2024). Available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/, Center for Preventive Action, Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Council on Foreign Relations, June 12 (2024). Available at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/al-shabab-somalia
  12. Human Rights Watch, Somalia: Events of 2023 (2024). Available at:  https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/somalia
  13. ACLED Data,  Somalia: The Government and Al-Shabaab Vie for the Support of  Clan Militias. September 15 (2023). Available at: https://acleddata.com/2023/09/15/somalia-situation-update-september-2023-the-government-and-al-shabaab-vie-over-the-support-of-clan-militias/ Center for Preventive Action, 2024
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