Introduction: Violence and militarization of the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta is one of the most oil and gas-rich regions in the world. Yet, it is mired in cycles of conflict and environmental crises that fuel underdevelopment and threaten human security.1 Each state in the region has unique and crosscutting forms of insecurity, including those linked to cultism, piracy, gang violence, land and boundary disputes, leadership tussles, secessionist agitations, and electoral violence. These conflicts are largely rooted in a complex array of social, political, environmental, and economic factors,2 with oil politics at the core. Ukiwo highlights a developmental paradox in which the oil sector has yet to fully catalyze local growth in the oil-producing Niger Delta region.3 Although a reduction in the level of violence was reported in 2024 and prior years, insecurity persists and continues to metamorphose in the context of frequently changing dynamics.4

To respond to the spate of violence, the Nigerian government launched a series of local and regional initiatives. These include the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), a Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP), and several military operations at the regional and state levels, either led by the military or coordinated through security formations such as Operation Crocodile Smile, Operation Python Dance, and the Joint Task Force (JTF).5

The disposition of the Nigerian government to conflicts in the region suggests that it prioritizes militarization over addressing the root causes of violence. This approach, rooted in securitization, has had devastating consequences, as it ignores that this engenders the instability it seeks to resolve, thereby creating a perpetual cycle of violence and delegitimizing the state in the eyes of its citizens.6

State repression and violence have been the main strategies deployed by successive regimes in the country in confronting uprisings in the Niger Delta. This often involves the drafting of armed security operatives to the region with orders to put down violent protests, cult-related, and inter-communal conflict.  This has culminated in the militarization of the region by the Nigerian state, an approach tantamount to killing a fly with a cannon, where disproportionate force is being applied to manage violent conflicts.7

The militarization of the region is clearly visible in the proliferation of police and military checkpoints on inter and intra-state highways across the region. A report estimated the existence of more than 26 checkpoints along the 77km East – West Road, from the outskirts of Port Harcourt in Rivers state to Yenagoa in neighboring Bayelsa state, averaging one checkpoint per 3 km.8 These checkpoints are associated with reports of extortion and harassment of motorists and passengers plying the road. 9.

Because people tend to place much more weight on how authorities exercise power as opposed to the ends for which that power is exercised, security agencies must recognize that violence reduction is not self-justifying. Police action, purportedly for the purpose of making communities safer, especially when excessive force is deployed,10.  can have the counterproductive result of destroying the very reservoir of trust on which communities and policing agencies depend for a proper functioning system.11 For example, Onyemaobi et. al. found that state repression is largely responsible for the increased militarization of secessionist agitation in Imo and Abia states of the Niger Delta. 12

Is the Niger Delta under-policed?

Paki notes that the government’s attention is usually focused on confronting uprisings and stamping out militant violence linked to protests against oil and gas operations,7 including an illicit economy linked to activities such as extortion at police/military checkpoints,8 illicit oil bunkering, and artisanal oil refining.13

Despite the high levels of violence, the existence of illicit economic activities, and the pervasive presence of security forces, some commentators have argued that the region is under-policed (13. Osho 14.   Arisukwu et al.,15. Titus and Ekpeyong argue that the security apparatus has been unable to effectively and promptly respond to insecurity linked to communal conflicts, cult wars, criminality, and gang-related violence, which are prevalent in the region. This presents a challenge to early response to conflict in the Niger Delta, notwithstanding the overbearing security presence in the region.

In the face of escalating security challenges, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), the primary national institution tasked with maintaining law and order, is overstretched in the face of security challenges across various parts of the country, thereby threatening its ability to effectively address the complex violence in the Niger Delta region.14

The inadequacy of police presence, especially in semi-urban and rural areas of the region, where there is a low level of community interactions with the police in conflict prevention and crime control, is complicating the security crisis.15Parts of the Niger-Delta have been characterized as ‘ungoverned spaces,’ a situation attributed to the limited presence of police personnel in such areas. 17 This shortfall has contributed to a security vacuum, as noted by Nextier Advisory and Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN).18 Osho also acknowledges that there are too few police officers assigned to patrol vast and often volatile territories in the region and the country at large, thus delaying response times to conflicts and violence. 14

In a study in Bayelsa state, for example, Titus and Ekpenyong suggest that a vast majority of the population reside in areas where there are no police stations within their immediate community.16 When state security presence is scanty, residents experience inadequate or poor state responses to conflicts.

To provide additional context to the situation in the region, Nigeria has a ratio of over 220 million citizens to an estimated 370,000 police officers. About 80 per cent of these officers are assigned to protect Very Important Persons (VIPs), including top-level government officials, politicians, traditional rulers, and business elites. This leaves about 20 per cent of police officers to engage in regular policing duties.19 Peter, however, argued  that, on the contrary, Nigeria is not necessarily under-policed, but that the police are underfunded, noting that “security is not won by headcount, but by capability.”20

Campbell supports the view that the police remain underfunded, and further argues that they are under-trained and too few to provide adequate security in the region. He noted further that because their corrupt and repressive practices are widely disliked by the populace, the issues of their ineffectiveness and delayed response to conflicts may not be adequately addressed by increasing their presence in communities in the Niger Delta. 21

Delayed response to conflicts and violence by security agencies

In the course of my APDD-supported research project, I conducted 124 interviews with conflict early warning and response (EWER) actors and community members in Cross River, Delta, and Ondo states to understand the effectiveness of conflict EWER programs in the Niger Delta region. One of my key findings is that, notwithstanding the important role of state security actors, their response to conflicts is usually delayed or absent.

The consensus among most of the community members interviewed was that community-based actors like vigilantes and community leaders provide prompt and more effective responses to conflicts, especially for communal conflicts, oil-related conflicts (e.g., pipeline vandalism), and herder-farmer clashes. This was corroborated by Titus and Ekpenyong, who found that local vigilante groups in a community in Bayelsa state were highly effective, making significant positive impacts on community safety, crime prevention, and fostering a sense of security and trust. 16

In some cases of inter-communal conflict over the ownership of oil fields, farmlands, and waterways in the Niger Delta, the response by state security forces has reportedly been very slow.22 Indeed, Joab-Peterside and Zalik suggest that state security personnel at times appear to observe the violence without intervening, especially where intelligence reports indicate that the state’s business interests are not threatened.23 This further confirms that delayed response, rather than lack of early warning information, remains the biggest weakness of state security actors’ and response systems in the Niger Delta. 24

The government has an important role to play in promptly responding to conflicts through a wide range of policies at its disposal. However, rather than treating conflict as an act of insubordination that requires force and coercion, preventive, participatory, and non-adversarial techniques are encouraged.25 Civil society also has its remit, especially around addressing problems which policymakers cannot get involved in because of their political sensitivity, and capitalizing on their familiarity with local capacities, networks, and structures.26

Community resilience as a panacea

To achieve an effective early response to conflicts in a militarized, yet under-policed, Niger Delta community, security agency collaboration and trust must be strengthened by fostering community ownership of security and peacebuilding processes. In this context, community policing presents a practical strategy. Community policing strategies are a cornerstone for increasing community resilience against conflicts and violence. These will contribute towards supporting law enforcement and human security by adopting a proactive approach. This technique emphasizes community-based trust-building and collaboration.27

Since some community members are part of the security operations in their communities, there is demonstrable potential for their capacity to proactively prevent and manage conflicts.15 In the Niger Delta, this can be a basis for building effective collaboration with security agencies about community policing. This could involve police-community partnership, police involvement in community affairs, and police-community information sharing. 18. Nextier Advocacy and Stakeholder Democracy Network, 28. Ordu and Nnam, for example, identify the use of technology such as WhatsApp for intelligence sharing and early response to conflicts.15,

It can also entail a systematic integration of reputable vigilantes and traditional authorities into the formal policing framework for more effective conflict prevention and violence management.28 This is exemplified in Ondo State, Southwest Nigeria, where the government took the concept of community policing a step further by establishing the ‘Amotekun,’ to complement the efforts of the Nigeria Police in combating kidnapping, armed robbery, and herdsmen-farmers violence.21

Community policing will help in preventing and resolving conflicts that occur within or between neighboring communities by increasing awareness of the roles that conflict actors, victims, and perpetrators can play in conflict transformation as stakeholders in the community. Part of this will include working at the community level with members of community-based groups, including vigilante groups who have hitherto acted as state agents of social control, in co-designing and implementing grassroots approaches to peace and security in their communities.28 This approach will help Niger Delta communities become more resilient by owning peacebuilding processes, identifying and responding to the roots of violent conflicts, with the support of the government and non-governmental organizations. 29

In conclusion, the government, by engaging local communities, can partner with them to build more resilience, as well as develop more effective responses to violent protests and conflicts. This will help build sustainable peace within communities and encourage members to overcome their distrust or fear of law enforcement agencies. Providing humanitarian services, nurturing positive relationships with the people, and adopting non-adversarial techniques for conflict resolution will go a long way in helping the local populace cooperate with security actors.30 Furthermore, economic strategies should be part of comprehensive peacebuilding frameworks, such as creating, expanding, and mainstreaming livelihood opportunities within peacebuilding programming.31 This requires the backing of robust political and economic institutions dedicated to the long-term transformation of the Niger Delta. 32

Endnotes

  1. Taft, P., and N. Haken. 2015. “Niger Delta Overview.” In Violence in Nigeria: Terrorism, Security, and Computation. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14935-6_2.
  2. Ebiede, T. A. 2021. “How Insecurity Affects the Lives of Everyone in the Niger Delta.” The Conversation. https://doi.org/10.64628/AAJ.rsv7xcfm4.
  3. Ukiwo, U. 2009. Causes and Cures of Oil-Related Niger Delta Conflicts. Policy Notes 2009/1. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97598/policy_notes2009-1.pdf
  4. Foundation for Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta. 2024. Niger Delta Annual Conflict Report: January to December 2024. Accessed January 2026. https://pindfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Niger-Delta-Annual-Conflict-Report-2024-1.pdf.
  5. Abdulwaheed, I. A., L. D. Ohida, and I. H. Olayinka. 2023. “An Assessment of the Impact of Security Challenges on Nigeria’s External Affairs, 2015–2023.” Journal of Political Discourse 1 (3): 277–293.
  6. Eyong, O. A. E. 2025. “Counterproductive Security: An Analysis of Oil Exploration, Militarization, and Conflict in the Niger Delta.” American Journal of Science and Advanced Technology 8 (1): 47–56.
  7. Paki, F. A. E. 2018. “An Overview of the Militarization of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.” Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy 10 (1): 71–97.
  8. Jeremiah, K. 2024. “How Checkpoints, Bad Roads Block Trade, Spike Inflation.” Accessed January 2026. https://guardian.ng/news/how-checkpoints-bad-roads-block-trade-spike-inflation/.
  9. Ifeanyichukwu, O., A. Mustapha, U. Edafe, and H. A. Hussaini. 2023. “Security Check Points and Police Extortion: A Study of Road Transport Corridors in Imo State, Nigeria.” Scholars International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 6 (10): 522–533.
  10. Nwadike, V. C. 2024. “Police Behavior at Checkpoints and Extortion Rates: Study of Major Traffic Corridors in Umuahia, Abia State.” International Journal of Development Strategies in Humanities, Management and Social Sciences 14 (1): 447–467.
  11. Blanks, J. 2023. “Black Communities Are Both Under policed and Overpoliced.” OppBlog. Accessed January 2026. https://freopp.org/oppblog/one-step-toward-repairing-the-broken-relationship-between-police-and-black-communities/.
  12. Onyemaobi, M. A., O. E. Chris-Sanctus, and E. C. Ngwu. 2023. “State Repression and Militarization of Secessionist Movement in Southeast Nigeria.” African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration 6 (1): 77–90. https://doi.org/10.52589/AJLPRA-WIN1436W.
  13. Transparency International. 2019. Military Involvement in Oil Theft in the Niger Delta: A Discussion Paper. Accessed January 2026. https://ti-defence.org/publications/military-involvement-in-oil-theft-in-the-niger-delta/.
  14. Osho, O. A. 2025. “Policing with Fewer Hands: Human Resource Crisis in the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and National Insecurity.” Niger Delta Journal of Gender, Peace & Conflict Studies 5 (1): 395–414.
  15. Arisukwu, O., et al. 2020. “Community Participation in Crime Prevention and Control in Rural Nigeria.” Heliyon 6: 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e05015.
  16. Titus, T., and A. S. Ekpenyong. 2023. “Sustainable Rural Policing and Community Development in Nigeria: A Study of Okutukutu Community in Yenagoa LGA, Bayelsa State.” Cross-Cultural Communication 19 (4): 71–79. https://doi.org/10.3968/13290.
  17. Babalola, D., and E. Seiyefa. 2025. “Organised Crime, Violent Conflicts and the Movement Towards a Dual Policing System in Nigeria.” The Round Table 114 (4): 417–435. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2025.2522843.
  18. Nextier Advisory and Stakeholder Democracy Network. 2016. Security and Stabilization Policy for the Niger Delta. Accessed February 2026. http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1.2.16-Abriged-Security-Management-Policy-For-The-Niger-Delta.pdf.
  19. Madueke, O. 2025. “Armed Banditry Is Becoming a Crisis in Nigeria: Why Fixing the Police Is Key.” The Conversation. Accessed January 2026. https://theconversation.com/armed-banditry-is-becoming-a-crisis-in-nigeria-why-fixing-the-police-is-key-261302.
  20. Peter, Y. 2025. “Nigeria Is Not Under-Policed. It Is Under-Funded, Poorly Equipped, and Politically Managed.” Medium. Accessed January 2026. https://medium.com/@poyinkor1959/nigeria-is-not-under-policed-it-is-under-funded-poorly-equipped-and-politically-managed-7fdd1bb741c5.
  21. Campbell, 2020. “The Prospect of Local Policing Amid Security Breakdown in Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed January 2026. https://www.cfr.org/blog/prospect-local-policing-amid-security-breakdown-nigeria.
  22. Campbell, J. 2017. “Communal Conflict Illustrates Nigeria’s Security Challenges.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed February 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/communal-conflict-illustrates-nigerias-security-challenges.
  23. Joab-Peterside, S., and A. Zalik. 2009. “The Commodification of Violence in the Niger Delta.” Pages 199–219. Accessed January 2026. https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/download/5904/2800/7831.
  24. Chibundu, J. 2026. “Experts Call for Swift Conflict Response to Curb Rising Violence in Nigeria.” Accessed January 2026. https://www.thecable.ng/experts-call-for-swift-conflict-response-to-curb-rising-violence-in-nigeria/.
  25. Okoh, R. 2005. “Conflict Management in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Participatory Approach.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 5 (1): 91–114. https://doi.org/10.4314/ajcr.v5i1.39387.
  26. Matveeva, A. 2006. Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Issue Paper 1. Accessed January 2026. https://gppac.net/files/2018-12/Early%20Warning%20and%20Early%20Response.pdf.
  27. Madrio, E. M. H., R. Daymiel, and M. L. B. Hamac. 2025. “Community Policing Strategies in Relation to Resiliency Against Criminality.” The Threshold 17 (3): 1–9.
  28. Ordu, G. E., and M. U. Nnam. 2017. “Community Policing in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of Current Developments.” International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 12 (1): 83–97. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.345716.
  29. Wordu, M. E., and E. N. Hanachor. 2021. “Community Policing Activities of Civilian Militia in Rivers State, Nigeria: Implications on Community Development.” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 26 (4:5): 35–42. https://doi.org/10.9790/0837-2604053542.
  30. Akinola, O. S. 2025. “From Resource Control to Oil Theft: Evolving Crime in the Niger-Delta and the Nigeria Police Force’s Role in Mitigation and Enforcement.” OCHENDO: An African Journal of Innovative Studies (OAJIS) 6 (1): 1–13.
  31. Ayinde, O. M. 2025. “The Economics of Peace in Nigeria: Intersection of Stability and Economic Development.” Crowther Journal of Arts and Humanities 2 (1): 68–84.https://acjol.org/index.php/crowther/article/download/6388/6185.
  32. Obi, Cyril. 2014. “Oil and Conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region: Between the Barrel and the Trigger.” The Extractive Industries and Society1 (2): 147–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2014.03.001.