Introduction

Transitional justice (TJ) has been hailed as Ethiopia’s long-awaited antidote for achieving the elusive quest for sustainable peace by addressing both old and current human rights violations. In the context of the new human rights quagmires, priority was placed on TJ to ensure sustainable peace, as outlined in the Pretoria Agreement signed between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).1  Yet, three years after the guns fell silent, Ethiopia’s TJ process remains politically fraught, institutionally weak, and deeply contested. This, however, is not because TJ is unattainable, but rather because the process was built on a faulty foundation.

The objective of this article is to investigate why the Ethiopian TJ process is faltering and unable to deliver results, despite the high premium placed on its ideals. The central argument being advanced is that the country’s TJ architecture inherited a serious “birth defect” from the Pretoria Agreement, and later in the Nairobi Declaration.2 The flaws embedded in how both agreements were negotiated, signed, and ‘implemented’ have fundamentally hindered the TJ implementation process and continue to impede its effectiveness. Unless these foundational defects are corrected, – though the possibility of this happening is very limited, – Ethiopia’s TJ process will find it challenging to meet its goals of justice, reconciliation, and, above all, sustainable peace.

The Roots of Transitional Justice in the Pretoria Agreement and Its Structural Flaws

After Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, Ethiopia began experimenting with ideas of reconciliation and national consensus through broad-based dialogue.3  However, none of these initiatives have produced a viable TJ framework in the country.4 The first concrete, perhaps coercive, step towards realizing TJ in Ethiopia was through the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022.5

The Pretoria agreement is lauded as the one that put an end to one of the nastiest wars of the 21st century. This agreement, among others, through Article 10 (3), obliged the Ethiopian government to implement a comprehensive national transitional justice program aimed at ensuring accountability, ascertaining the truth, redressing victims, and fostering reconciliation and healing – consistent with its Constitution and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. This provision, which stipulates that accountability must be pursued through a comprehensive national process, is perhaps one of the primary structural flaws in implementing TJ. While this sounds like an affirmation of domestic ownership, in reality, it is the primary operational shortcoming that made the practical implementation of TJ processes unrealistic. Several reasons explain why this is so.

First, in a country where the independence of national institutions, including national courts, remains severely constrained and where political influence over national institutions is widely documented,6 it is tough to say that Pretoria is serious about a national TJ process. The conviction that national institutions could impartially ensure accountability for human rights violations in which the state itself is implicated is problematic. The same can also be said of institutions’ ability to undertake meaningful truth-seeking or to realize a momentous institutional reform.  Among others, Ethiopia’s federal institutions, such as its defense forces, are themselves reportedly deeply implicated in wartime atrocities.7 The TPLF, which is equally an actor in the implementation of the TJ process, also stands accused of committing serious atrocities that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.8 Entrusting these same parties with leading the TJ process, in many respects, contradicts the very essence of justice –  no one shall be a judge in their own cause.

Of course, the TPLF, which had initially demanded some form of international or hybrid mechanism, later signed the agreement that ties accountability strictly to national mechanisms. The explanation of this U-turn, among others, may lie in self-interest. TPLF forces have also been implicated in grave violations, including atrocities in Amhara and Afar regions.9 The absence of an international mechanism also shields TPLF forces from robust scrutiny. This clearly indicates that, despite the fanfare that heralded the Pretoria agreement, neither party had an incentive to seriously implement a process that could expose them to genuine prosecution. As we are currently witnessing, the agreement was imposed on both sides due to war fatigue and international pressure.10 The agreement, however, presented an excellent opportunity for both parties to give their exhausted militaries a break, while presenting themselves as peace-loving parties to the international community. Pretoria Agreement’s TJ initiative, hence, emerged from a deeply compromised political bargain.

Second, another striking flaw lies in the agreement’s provision on sexual and gender-based violence. Article 4(2) requires the parties to only “condemn” acts such as rape, sexual slavery, and violence against women. For crimes of this magnitude, recognized internationally as among the most heinous wartime atrocities, “condemnation” is no substitute for prosecution. The provision does not specify whether this condemnation refers to abuses before, during, or after the war, nor does it link these crimes to the TJ commitments under Article 10 (3). This disconnect is too glaring to be accidental.

Third, the Pretoria agreement contains one of the weakest monitoring and verification frameworks seen in any recent peace process.11 Under Article 11, the task of verifying one of the world’s recent deadliest conflicts was delegated to a small group of experts, without them having any meaningful presence on the ground, without coercive authority, and without robust mechanisms for compliance. It was predictable that such a weak framework could not sustain peace. Indeed, this weakness may have also been intentional. As previously alluded to, in the face of extreme war casualties, both parties were more interested in a temporary pause to reorganize their forces than in a permanent settlement.

Nairobi Declaration: The Agreement that Guaranteed further Failure

Barely 10 days after the Pretoria agreement was signed, a follow-up declaration was signed in Nairobi, purportedly to clarify and operationalize the Pretoria agreement – in reality, Nairobi introduced new ambiguities. Particularly problematic is the provision requiring “unnamed forces” to withdraw from Tigray alongside the disarmament of the TPLF combatants. While the TPLF consistently maintained that these unnamed forces referred to Eritrean troops and Amhara regional forces, the federal government has never publicly clarified how it understood or interpreted this provision. Setting aside the question of whether the provision was legally and/or practically sound, it is difficult to imagine how any cessation of hostilities agreement could realistically expect forces that were not signatories and not named – yet were central actors in the conflict – to abide by the terms and conditions of an agreement. This ambiguity allowed both the federal government and TPLF to interpret the terms of the agreement selectively. Clarity would have constrained the political maneuvering of both parties; ambiguity, by contrast, allowed each party to weaponize or manipulate the agreement as needed. Predictably, the federal government is now in open armed conflict with Amhara (Fano) forces and remains in a hostile standoff with Eritrea12 , two of the unnamed yet central actors to the conflict. In effect, the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements froze one conflict only to create conditions for the eruption of another.13

The disarmament plan outlined in the Nairobi Declaration is another sticking point that has made TJ almost impossible to implement. With reference to heavy weaponry, Article 2 (2.1) (d) stipulated that disarmament would occur concurrently with the withdrawal of the unnamed forces (“foreign and non-ENDF forces” in the wording of the declaration) from Tigray. As already mentioned, these forces were not signatories to the agreement, and no mechanism existed to compel or verify their withdrawal. This created a structurally impossible precondition. TPLF disarmament was tied to the actions of actors entirely outside the agreement’s legal and political framework. The plan for the disarmament of fighters in possession of light weapons was equally unworkable. The declaration required a detailed disarmament plan within fourteen days. However, expecting a comprehensive, credible, and mutually trusted disarmament blueprint in two weeks, amid extreme mistrust, ongoing troop movements, and the presence of non-signatory forces, was simply unrealistic.

Taken together, these provisions were unable to create a pathway to sustainable peace. In fact, they created incentives for renewed conflict. By requiring TPLF disarmament while leaving the fate and intentions of non-signatory combatants unaddressed, the agreement encouraged all sides to use the temporary pause not for reconciliation but for regrouping, repositioning, and preparing for the next phase of both political and military confrontation. Under such conditions, the disarmament plan did not support a stable transition. Instead, it temporarily froze active fighting while laying the groundwork for future hostilities. These developments, among others, made it difficult to imagine how a TJ process emerging from such a flawed security arrangement could deliver meaningful accountability, peace, or reconciliation.

On this point, it is also important to highlight the role of international ‘observers’ (particularly the US) that were present during negotiations in both Pretoria and Nairobi. The question remains: why were such clearly discernible flaws embedded in both agreements never identified or signposted by these international observers? One can continue to speculate whether this was due to geopolitical considerations or misplaced optimism. Yet, their silence undeniably contributed to the flawed foundations on which Ethiopia’s TJ process now rests.

Given these structural defects, the TJ process emerging from Pretoria is expected to struggle to survive.14 The Pretoria and Nairobi pacts provided temporary respite, not pathways to peace.

Is there a Way Out?

However, all hope is not lost, and there is a chance that the TJ process can be rescued despite its foundational and structural flaws. The first step would be to break the political deadlock and contradictory narratives. There are three dominant political narratives surrounding the Pretoria Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration. First, claims that this agreement is the sole thread binding Tigray to the Ethiopian state, implying that without the Pretoria Agreement, there would be no legal or political relationship between the two,15  let alone a TJ process. The second view contends that the only viable path to lasting peace between Tigray and the federal government lies in the full and unqualified implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.16 The third position is totally dismissive of the Pretoria Agreement; if at all, it contends that Pretoria is the mother of the unfolding quagmire, particularly as it relates to the insurgency in the Amhara region and the unravelling relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.17

These mutually exclusive political narratives have made it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure lasting peace. In fact, these narratives have entrenched a fragile post-ceasefire logic that complicates, rather than resolves, the underlying power struggles, legitimacy deficits, and unresolved questions of accountability and governance that gave rise to the conflict in the first place. Without going into the validity of each argument, Ethiopia cannot achieve meaningful TJ by merely insisting on the implementation of the defective Pretoria and Nairobi agreements. Both agreements have outlived their utility; they now serve as political tools rather than instruments of peace. For Ethiopia to pursue genuine justice and sustainable peace, a renewed and serious round of negotiations is indispensable. However, it must be one that openly confronts the structural flaws embedded in the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, and establishes an accountability framework that is credible, inclusive, participatory, and enforceable. Such an approach is more realistic and also far more sustainable than the current trajectory marked by the devastating violence in the Amhara region and the growing risk of an interstate confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Until the structural defects within these agreements are acknowledged and addressed, Ethiopia’s TJ process will not be able to deliver justice, reconciliation, or sustainable peace.

Endnotes

  1. African Union. Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Pretoria, South Africa, 2022. https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf
  2. African Union, Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) (2022).
  3. These were through the establishment of institutions like the now defunct Reconciliation Commission and the currently operational National Dialogue Commission.
  4. See for instance, Patrick Wright, “Ethiopia: Why PM Abiy’s National Dialogue Is Dead on Arrival,” African Arguments, March 2022, https://africanarguments.org/2022/03/ethiopia-why-pm-abiys-national-dialogue-is-dead-on-arrival/
  5. This is essentially enshrined under the agreement’s Article 10(3)
  6. Nega Ewunetie, The Role of Judicial Independence in the Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia: Analysis of the Legal and Institutional Frameworks and Federal Court Practices, Hawassa University Journal of Law, Vol 9, 2025; Freedom House, Ethiopia: Freedom in the World 2025(2025), https://freedomhouse.org/country/ethiopia/freedom-world/2025
  7. Human Rights Watch, “Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’s Western Tigray Zone,” April 6, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone
  8. Amnesty International, Ethiopia: Summary Killings, Rape and Looting by Tigrayan Forces in Amhara (February 2022), https://www.amnesty.de/sites/default/files/2022-02/Amnesty-Bericht-Aethiopien-Amhara-TPLF-Kaempfer-Gewalt-gegen-Zivilbevoelkerung-Februar-2022.pdf
  9. United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (A/HRC/54/55, Advance Unedited Version), https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/report-international-commission-human-rights-experts-ethiopia-ahrc5455-advance-unedited-
  10. “What Is the Fate of the Pretoria Peace Agreement in Ethiopia?” Africa Press, 24/11/2025, https://www.africa-press.net/en/articles/what-is-the-fate-of-the-pretoria-peace-agreement-in-ethiopia
  11. Dahilon Yassin Mohamoda, Red Sea Reckonings: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Unraveling of Pretoria, July 16, 2025, https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2025/07/16/red-sea-reckonings-ethiopia-eritrea-and-the-unraveling-of-pretoria/; Daniel Berhane, Ethiopia Could Still Avert the Next War With Eritrea, Foreign Policy, September 2, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/09/02/ethiopia-eritrea-tigray-war-pretoria-agreement/,
  12. Fikir G. Mekonnen, “A Year after the Pretoria Agreement, Hard Work Remains for Ethiopia,” Institute for Security Studies, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-year-after-the-pretoria-agreement-hard-work-remains-for-ethiopia; Yakob Yatene, “The Pretoria Agreement for Tigray: One Year After,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung – Horn of Africa, November 1, 2023, https://hoa.boell.org/en/2023/11/01/pretoria-agreement-tigray-one-year-after
  13. This is especially true in the context of the fast-paced conflict dynamics emerging between Ethiopia and Eritrea
  14. Yohannes Haile, “The Transitional Justice Policy of Ethiopia and Its Relevance for Peacebuilding,” African Journal on Conflict Resolution, ACCORD, https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-transitional-justice-policy-of-ethiopia-and-its-relevance-for-peacebuilding/
  15. Assefa Leake Gebru, “The Pretoria Agreement: Reflections on Its Essence, Implementation Status and the Way Forward,” Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies 6, no. 1 (2024).
  16. Refugees International, The Tigray War Five Years On: The Pretoria Agreement and the Need for Peace, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/events-and-testimony/the-tigray-war-five-years-on-ethiopia-the-pretoria-agreement-and-the-need-for-peace/
  17. See, “Ethiopian Civilians ‘Caught in the Crossfire’ of Amhara Conflict,” Arab News, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2626796/world; see also Abiy Ahmed, address to the House of Peoples’ Representatives, where he stated that the Pretoria agreement is what unraveled the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qioo9FI1ZAM