Introduction

In May 2023, the government of Lesotho tabled the Omnibus Bill (10th and 11th Amendment to the Constitution) in parliament. The bill contained 90 amendments to the Constitution. The government divided the amendments into three major categories. The first group consisted of the amendments that require a simple majority to pass. The second requires a two-thirds majority, and the last category, a referendum to alter the basic structure of the constitution.1 The Bill is the main output of the National Peace Reforms; however, the reforms have not passed in parliament because the two houses of parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate, are at loggerheads over the reforms. This essay examines the conflict between the two houses of parliament.

The ongoing reforms were recommended by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) commission of inquiry, which sat in 2015 after the assassination of Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao. Mahao was Commander of the Lesotho Defence Force from 2012 to 2015, when Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili replaced him with Lt. General Tlali Kamoli.2 In 2017, Lesotho held national elections for the third time in five years. On 16 June 2017, Thomas Thabane became the Prime Minister by leading a coalition of four parties. He pledged to implement the reforms as part of a national priority agenda.3 The same year, the government drafted a proposal for the reforms, “The Lesotho We Want: Dialogue and Reforms National Transformation.” In November, it presented this to stakeholders in Maseru. Its main objectives were to ensure long-term national stability, unity, and reconciliation, to create efficient bureaucracies to manage public affairs, and to provide service delivery and development, as well as to build national consensus on, and implementation of, constitutional reforms as the primary basis to address constitutional fault lines that had contributed to political instability.4

Resistance and Legal Conflicts over the Government’s Approach to the Reforms

In 2018, the government passed the National Reforms Dialogue Act. The Act paved the way for the establishment of the National Leaders’ Forum (NLF) and the National Dialogue Planning Committee (NDPC). The two bodies convened a dialogue in December 2019. The primary outcome of the dialogue was a proposal to form the National Reforms Authority (NRA). The Authority was launched as a multi-stakeholder body constituted by thirty-three members representing political parties and civil society organisations, with a secretariat to oversee the everyday running of the reforms.5

The Authority was short-lived. Soon after its establishment, the COVID-19 pandemic spread to southern Africa. Lockdown measures to combat the virus affected the NRA’s activities. When its statutory period ended in April 2022, it had only drafted the Omnibus Bill. While drafting the Bill, the politicians, who dominated the reforms, removed numerous amendments that the people wanted. With mounting pressure from SADC, the government quickly passed the reforms before the parliamentary term came to an end in July 2022, and before elections were held in October. It put the Bill through the National Assembly without reaching the constitutional voting threshold mandated to alter various clauses of the constitution.6

On 13 July 2022, the parliament’s five-year term ended before the Bill was passed. The Prime Minister declared a State of Emergency to recall the parliament. The recalled parliament passed the Bill. On 25 August 2022, Kananelo Boloetse and Advocate Lintle Tuke separately challenged the Declaration of the State of Emergency in the High Court. The High Court consolidated its motions into one because “…of the same cause of action impugning the Prime Minister’s declaration of a state of emergency and the resultant recall of Parliament by His Majesty the King.” On 12 September 2022, the High Court ruled in favour of the two applicants, and the reforms could not pass in parliament before the elections.7

The Exclusion of Popular In-puts and Precipitation of the Elite Conflict

Something unexpected changed the country’s political landscape in the run-up to the 2022 elections. About six months before the elections, Samuel Ntsokoane Matekane, a businessman and one of the country’s millionaires, launched a political party, the Revolution for Prosperity (RFP), in March. With a membership dominated by business elites and urban-based middle classes, he won 56 seats in parliament and led a coalition government of three parties. At this stage of the reforms, a conflict between the people and the chiefs, on the one hand, and the political elites and the government, on the other, had emerged. In 2019, the Planning Committee commissioned a public participatory study to gather the people’s inputs across the country. These were discussed in the official gathering known as the Plenary II.8

The consensus held by the public was that the 1993 constitution gave the Prime Minister unlimited powers. For the people, this was precisely why the country was constantly engulfed in political conflicts.9 The King, as head of state, only acts on the advice of the Prime Minister. The current constitution was adopted in 1993 when the country transitioned from a military dictatorship to an electoral democracy. The 1993 constitution was an adaptation of the 1966 independence constitution, the Westminster constitutional monarchy, which Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan suspended in 1970, ruling dictatorially until 1986 when the military toppled him.10

The public demanded that the powers of the Prime Minister must be limited, while those of the King must be increased in two main litigious areas. First, such power abuses manifested in the appointment or dismissal of ministers, judicial officers, security chiefs, heads of oversight institutions, and statutory officials.11 Second, they were demonstrated in the prorogation and dissolution of the parliament. Section 83 of the Constitution gives the Prime Minister the power to advise the King, who cannot decline, to prorogue or dissolve Parliament. Historically, the Prime Ministers have played this political card to subvert a motion of no confidence against them.12

The Elites’ Struggle for Power and Access to State Resources

Through colonial policy, Lesotho became one of the leading suppliers of labor to the mines in South Africa.13 A new ruling elite – comprador in nature – emerged, serving colonial interests of ensuring the supply of cheap labour.14 Throughout colonial rule, 1868-1966, this social structure evolved. Among other things, missionary education produced a small, educated elite who sought the power possessed by chiefs. The two groups formed Lesotho’s middle class — one, the chiefs based on wealth and so-called birthright status and entitlement, and the other, the educated elites, based on education, aspirations to imbibe the culture of rulers, rejection of chiefly rule and anything they deemed ‘traditional’, and so on. What the two groups had in common was a desire to maintain their hegemonic positions in society, along with the privileges associated with their middle-class status.

After independence in 1966, the politicians’ strategy was to cull the powers of the chieftainship. The 1993 constitution significantly limited the powers of the King. The Senate now demands that the National Assembly implement the people’s will before the reforms can pass. The parliament consists of two leading houses: the Senate (Upper Chamber) and the National Assembly (Lower Chamber). The latter consists of 120 members who serve for a five-year term. Eighty members are elected and forty are appointed through the Proportional Representation system. It is the main legislative body. It enacts laws for the governance and administration of the country. The Senate has thirty-three members: twenty-two Principal Chiefs and eleven Senators nominated by the King. It reviews bills submitted by the National Assembly. It can propose, debate, and vote on draft legislation and amendments.15

Conclusion

The ongoing peace reforms are a locus of elites’ struggle for power and access to, and control over, national resources. The political elites in the post-colonial period inherited the colonial system of governance, which privileged the chiefs; however, due to poor governance and political instability, the people wanted their constitutional powers to be limited while increasing those of the King. The chiefs now demand more power to govern alongside the politicians. As the leading regional body pushing for the reforms to pass in parliament, SADC has taken a neutral position, however, on the rather volatile political situation. The current relative peace and political stability in Lesotho are therefore precarious. It is hinged on the balance of power between the King and the Prime Minister, the maintenance of cordial relations between them, and the issue of who controls the military. This is short-termism. If the Prime Minister loses the next elections in two years, this balance of power may crumble, plunging the country into another cycle of conflicts and political instability.

However, the peace reforms must be presented to the public before they can be passed in parliament, despite numerous amendments from popular inputs being removed by politicians. Democracy and inclusivity must be given priority in reforms if the country is to achieve durable peace.

Endnotes

  1. ’Nyane, Hoolo. “Lesotho Needs Constitutional Reforms to Help Gain Political Stability – But the Latest Attempt Is Flawed.” The Conversation, November 2024. https://theconversation.com/lesotho-needs-constitutional-reforms-to-help-gain-political-stability-but-the-latest-attempt-is-flawed-237905. Accessed January 20, 2025.
  2. Southern African Development Community. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Commission of Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao: Final Report 2015. 2015. https://www.gov.ls/reforms/. Accessed January 16, 2024.
  3. Government of Lesotho. The Lesotho We Want: Dialogue and Reforms for National Transformation: Vision, Overview and Roadmap. November 2017. https://www.gov.ls/download-category/reforms/?cp=2. Accessed August 30, 2024.
  4. Government of Lesotho. The Lesotho We Want. Maseru: Government of Lesotho, 2017, 4.
  5. Government of Lesotho. Final Declaration of the Lesotho Multi-Stakeholder National Dialogue, Held from 25 to 27 November 2019. 2019. https://www.gov.ls/download-category/reforms/?cp=2. Accessed August 30, 2024.
  6. Lesotho Court of Appeal. Judgment No. 32 of 2022. November 11, 2022. https://lesotholii.org/akn/ls/judgment/lsca/2022/32/eng@2022-11-11. Accessed February 18, 2025.
  7. ’Nyane, Hoolo, and M. Makhobole. Expert Report on Constitutional Reforms (Incorporating Public Consultations and Written Submissions). Government of Lesotho, 2019. https://www.gov.ls/download-category/reforms/?cp=2. Accessed August 30, 2024.
  8. Machobane, L. B. B. J. The King’s Knights: Military Governance in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1986–1993. Roma: Institute of Southern African Studies, 2001.
  9. Government of Lesotho. The Constitution of Lesotho. Maseru: Government Printers, 1993.
  10. Murray, Colin. “From Granary to Labour Reserve: An Economic History of Lesotho.” South African Labour Bulletin 6, no. 4 (1980): 3–20.
  11. Ashton, Hugh. The Basuto: A Social Study of Traditional and Modern Lesotho. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
  12. ’Nyane, Hoolo. “Lesotho Needs Constitutional Reforms to Help Gain Political Stability – But the Latest Attempt Is Flawed.” The Conversation, November 2024. https://theconversation.com/lesotho-needs-constitutional-reforms-to-help-gain-political-stability-but-the-latest-attempt-is-flawed-237905. Accessed January 20, 2025.
  13. Murray, Colin. “From Granary to Labour Reserve: An Economic History of Lesotho.” South African Labour Bulletin 6, no. 4 (1980): 3–20.
  14. Ashton, Hugh. The Basuto: A Social Study of Traditional and Modern Lesotho.London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
  15. Government of Lesotho. The Constitution of Lesotho.Maseru: Government Printers, 1993.

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