Introduction
The year 2024 marks two decades since the publication of the final report of the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone” (TRCSL). The report attempted to provide an antidote to future conflicts after reviewing evidence of the causes and nature of the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991–2002). However, the events leading to, and following, the 2023 presidential elections in Sierra Leone raise important questions about the effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms to prevent future conflicts. The major eruptions of violence, ethno-political tensions, and civil unrest, leading to the biggest decline in freedom of expression and assembly in 18 years, cast serious doubt on the extent in which the transitional justice methods used shaped the trajectory of governance and politics in post-conflict Sierra Leone for the better.1
The argument of this essay is based on a study conducted in Sierra Leone between 2021 and 2024, involving a wide range of respondents, including former senior staff members from the TRCSL and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), as well as senior professionals in civil society, academia, and the justice and security sectors. A total of 15 interviews were conducted, alongside 18 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) of eight participants each, totalling 144 participants in Kailahun, Bombali, and Western Urban districts of the country. The table below shows the demographics of the respondents.
Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Post-War Sierra Leone
By the end of the Sierra Leonean Civil War, the country pursued a hybrid approach to transitional justice with the creation of the TRCSL and the SCSL. The former was based on political settlement under the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999, while the latter was set up as a response to the international community’s aim to end impunity and bring an end to the continued infractions by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The TRCSL focused on investigating the causes and nature of the war; to inform future constitutional and governance arrangements so the reoccurrence of violence could be prevented. The SCSL, on the other hand, was established to try those responsible for the gravest crimes, combining elements of both international and domestic law; Sierra Leonean and international judges. Both the TRCSL and SCSL were mechanisms to end the cycle of conflict. After a comprehensive report and high-profile convictions, there was a general consensus that the two transitional justice mechanisms were largely successful in their mandate.
Alongside the TRCSL and the SCSL, there were other post-war reconciliation measures, partly resulting from recommendations made by the TRCSL, such as a (limited) reparations program and a set of institutional reform efforts. Some community-led interventions organised by local actors focused on promoting reconciliation and healing at the community level, which was largely untouched by the TRCSL and SCSL. The most significant outlier measure was the Fambul Tok initiative (meaning “Family Talk”), which has been able to reach remote and isolated communities using methods that are locally owned and sustainable. Thus, it continued to function as a traditional method that helped to fill the gaps of the TRCSL. However, while many of these interventions were widely received, their dependence on donor funding meant their coverage was limited. The failure of successive governments to deepen these efforts and integrate them in a wider governmental strategy means most of the current population lacks the socialization to embrace values of peace and tolerance, required to moderate the tensions inherent in democratic settings. This failure presents important challenges in relation to reconciliation, social cohesion, and most importantly, the ability of the country to build resilient structures against fragility and conflict.2
The Failures of Transitional Justice as a Conflict Prevention Mechanism and the Reproduction of Violence in Post-War Sierra Leone
While much of the approach to transitional justice in Sierra Leone was focused on addressing the atrocities committed by the belligerent factions and providing redress to victims, it was also meant to promote the prevention of violence. This was crucial not just for Sierra Leone, but for the wider West Africa region, which was dealing with civil wars, political violence, and autocratic regimes. However, only a few years after the end of the Sierra Leonean Civil War, the gaps in the transitional justice process started to undermine the quest for durable peace and stability in the country.
Competing Narratives
From the very start of the transitional justice process in Sierra Leone, a major challenge was the inability of the TRCSL and the SCSL to collaborate effectively. The operations and impact of the TRCSL were much affected by the dynamics brought by the SCSL. The international community steered its interest away from the TRCSL towards the operations of the SCSL, resulting in much less funding for the TRCSL than expected. According to respondents, this lack of resources limited the TRCSL’s operations and eventual impact on the country.
The SCSL’s actions suggest they did not value the TRCSL as an equal partner, thereby limiting effective collaboration and access to indictees. A senior staff member of the TRCSL commented on the SCSL’s President Geoffrey Robertson:
“[He] said we should suspend the work of the Truth Commission until the Special Court had finished all its cases and closed shop. […] Geoffrey Robertson […] describes truth commissions as a climbdown from justice.”3
This raises fundamental questions about SCSL’s understanding of the transitional justice process they were part of. TheSCSL refused some high-profile suspects to testify before the TRCSL. As a consequence of this, the accounts of those bearing the greatest responsibility for the serious crimes against civilians and UN peacekeepers were not included in the historical record produced. The accounts of the experiences and perspectives of those actors could have provided further clarity to their roles in the conflict.
While the TRCSL produced a nuanced account of the factors that led to the war, the SCSL argued that the war was “born out of greed and greed alone and was motivated by the main leaders’ intention to have control over an important commodity in the country: diamonds.”4 This different narrative ignores the underlying causes and institutional pathologies brought forward by the TRCSL. This is problematic since the SCSL was more visible than the TRCSL, lasted for a longer time, and possessed more funds to assert its narrative.
In addition, governments privileged the political causes of the civil war and the threat the SCSL posed on the political establishment in the country. This removed incentives for the subsequent governments to focus on the TRCSL report, which in addition to political issues highlights important governance and institutional factors that hampered future reforms.
Lack of Meaningful Inclusive Engagement with the Local Context
The study and literature show that there was a lack of meaningful engagement between the transitional justice mechanisms and those most affected by the war. The SCSL, which was not understood by the public, was perceived to be a Western-owned and led court. Although the TRCSL was more locally driven, it was short-lived and engaged with only a limited number of Sierra Leoneans – approximately 7,000. This is particularly galling in a country that experienced 11 years of civil war, with almost every community gravely affected by violence.
There were other largely unaddressed factors that were vital for the achievement of sustainable peace in the country. Principal among them, was the need to provide comprehensive Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) for both victims and ex-combatants, as well as the opening of a socio-economic and political space for the youth and women. This failure and the subsequent disillusionment, especially among young people, contributed to the resurgence of violence in post-war Sierra Leone. Factors such as violent masculinity, Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), and the use of drugs and other harmful substances, left communities insecure. Furthermore, the distrust between young people and political elites deepened, contributing to the emergence of gangs and cliques, especially in major cities. This points at the continued socialisation with violence among the youth, impacting their quest for recognition and identity, which they believe the state had denied them. In the last decade, there have been several clashes between state security actors and young people, which have left the youth questioning not just their relationship with the state but also their own citizenship.5
It is worth noting that the Sierra Leone society has remained deeply traumatised, with trans-generational trauma contributing to the increased level of violence experienced among young people. This is coupled with the compounding consequences of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on an already traumatised population.
Failure of Political Leadership
Several arguments have been made over the years that more investments in the TRCSL and a full roll-out of its report would have been meaningful in strengthening prevention mechanisms. Ad-hoc implementation of the recommendations characterized the post-war governments, and a cohesive monitoring mechanism was non-existent. It further undermined the awareness of the public of their existence and relevance, with state institutions not capacitated to own and roll them out. Most of the respondents indicated that they were not familiar with the recommendations of the TRCSL, and stated the need for them to be popularized despite being published 20 years ago. However, the respondents expressed doubt in the willingness of the government to undertake such a venture, even though it would address current and future challenges in the country.
While institution building and the reformation of the security and justice sectors were central to the promotion of prevention, the political leadership that was required to drive them was missing. In fact, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in the country was mainly driven by the British government,6 and not locally owned or funded. This seriously impacted the SSR process, which stopped after the British was no longer funding it. The approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants was also not sustainable, with most of them left vulnerable to political actors.
An essential component of the democratisation process that was needed to strengthen citizenship and the rights and freedoms of Sierra Leoneans was the Constitutional Review process, which ensued more than a decade ago. However, there has not been any clear sign of its completion, which brings to question the desire of political elites to strengthen democratic good governance in the country. This further increases the suspicion of political elites among the masses, especially given the economic hardship in the country.
Most respondents noted that the reproduction of violence in the Sierra Leonean society has been augmented by the ethno-regionalized nature of the politics in the country and the frequent tensions between the two major parties, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the All Peoples Congress (APC).
Papering Over the Cracks: Contemporary Efforts at Dialogue and Reconciliation and the Looming Challenges
While the transition of power from the APC to the SLPP in 2018 was relatively smooth, the country has been trapped in a constant state of struggle since then, dragging it through a continuous trajectory of violence and instability. Immediately after the elections, the SLPP accused the APC of being corrupt, which the APC countered by stating that their leaders were subjects of a ‘witch-hunt.’ They further argued that state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary, were instrumentalised against them, leading to a stark divide in the nation.
There was a need for a dialogue to reconcile the country and the government and set a national agenda for peace. From 23 to 25 May 2019, they organised a conference on democratic consolidation for peace and national cohesion in Freetown, dubbed Bintumani III conference.7 However, the opposition did not attend the conference, saying that they were not integrated into the planning process and the invitations were received very late. It became obvious that the outcomes of the conference would not achieve the intended objectives.
Following the recommendations of the conference, the government established the Independent Commission for Peace and National Cohesion (ICPNC) to “prevent, manage and resolve conflicts; and to build, promote and maintain sustainable peace in Sierra Leone and to provide for other related matters.”8 The establishment of the Commission was met with criticisms, especially as the opposition argued that its leadership was pro-SLPP. Between 2019 and 2023, the political situation further deteriorated, leading to contentious elections in July 2023. The results were contested by the APC, arguing that the elections were stolen by the ruling SLPP. What became glaring was the refusal of the APC to seek redress through the use of the courts. According to them, the courts are compromised and had acted against the APC on several occasions, including what they considered to be the unjust unseating and replacement with SLPP members of ten of their parliamentarians in 2019.9
Subsequently, the APC refused to participate in governance. This impasse led to the October 2023 dialogue facilitated by international actors, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and the Commonwealth. This dialogue resulted in the APC allowing its elected officials to return to their respective functions, but despite that, the relationship between the two parties has not improved. The Presidential Aspirant of the APC, Dr. Samura Kamara, insists on the need for electoral justice to be pursued.10 It is unclear as to what this means in practical terms, as the country remains divided over the outcome of the October 23 dialogue.
An incident that subsequently deepened tensions in the county is what the government has termed the ‘failed coup’ on November 23, 2023, further demonstrating the lack of cohesion and the need for a clear approach to healing, reconciliation, and peacebuilding. The persistent failure to adhere to the rule of law in the exercise of executive authority continues to be a source of major resentment.
Conclusions and Policy Reflections on Transitional Justice Remedies and the Prevention of Violence in Sierra Leone
A lack of collectiveness and cohesion has characterised the transitional justice process in Sierra Leone from the beginning. The failure to escape the post-conflict trajectory has necessitated the need for reflections not just on the historical legacies of the war, but also on the post-war occurrences that continue to divide the country. Both the Bintumani III conference and the post-elections dialogue draw attention to the desire for a conversation on justice, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone. The ongoing dialogues further point at the lack of cohesiveness and the need for a broader approach to transitional justice that will strengthen peace and security in the country.
The government should return to the TRCSL recommendations and contextualise them to enhance their relevance in contemporary Sierra Leone. Furthermore, a mechanism should be created to monitor the implementation process. This could serve as input for a national agenda to promote healing and reconciliation in the country. The approach should be based on a restorative rather than retributive justice to avoid further fragmenting the country, which includes healing and restoration of social relations and systems.
The finalization of the Constitutional Review process should be prioritised. The revised constitution should further guarantee the rights and freedoms of Sierra Leoneans, with depoliticised institutions that are adequately provided with the capacity to deliver on their mandates to protect those rights.
Any future attempt to implement transitional justice mechanisms in Sierra Leone should be locally owned and driven, with an inclusive, integrated, and comprehensive approach to ensure sustainability. The promotion of democratic good governance should be central so the socio-economic and political space for women and the youth is opened across the respective districts and regions of the country.
Endnotes
- Amnesty International. “The State of the World’s Human Rights.” 2024. Accessed August 31, 2024. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/7200/2024/en/.
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World: Sierra Leone.” 2024. Accessed August 31, 2024. https://freedomhouse.org/country/sierra-leone/freedom-world/2024.
2. Interview with John Caulker, Founder of Fambul Tok, 2021.
Bangura, Ibrahim. “Leaving Behind the Worst of the Past: Transitional Justice and Prevention in Sierra Leone.” 2021. Accessed August 31, 2024. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Report_Prevention_SierraLeone.pdf.
3. Interview with the Chief Investigator of the TRCSL, conducted in 2021.
4. PBS News Hour (2002) ‘Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone.’ Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcVimeSnJmQ&t=153s [Accessed on 31 August 2024].
5. Ainley, Kirsten, Rebekka Friedman, and Chris Mahony, eds. Evaluating Transitional Justice: Accountability and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 241–64.
Mitton, Kieran. “A Pragmatic Pact: Reconciliation and Reintegration in Sierra Leone.” In Evaluating Transitional Justice: Accountability and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, edited by Kirsten Ainley, Rebekka Friedman, and Chris Mahony, 217–40. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Kelsall, Tim. “Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone.” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2005): 361–91.
6. Bangura, Ibrahim. “An Assessment of Orthodox Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone.” Center for Security Governance, Canada, 2016.
7. News Post. “President Julius Maada Bio Addresses Conference on Peace and National Cohesion in Freetown.” 2019. Accessed August 30, 2024. https://statehouse.gov.sl/president-julius-maada-bio-addresses-conference-on-peace-and-national-cohesion-in-freetown/.
8. Parliament of Sierra Leone. “BILL: Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXLXI, No. 63, dated 1st October 2020.” 2020. Accessed August 30, 2024. https://www.parliament.gov.sl/uploads/bill_files/The%20Independent%20Comm.%20for%20Peace%20and%20National%20Cohesion%20Act,%202020.pdf.
9. Politico SL. “Sierra Leone’s Main Opposition Party Loses 10 Parliamentary Seats to Petition.” 2019. Accessed August 29, 2024. https://politicosl.com/articles/sierra-leones-main-opposition-party-loses-10-parliamentary-seats-petition.
10. The Organiser News. “Electoral Justice as Pronounced by the APC Leader Dr. Samura Kamara Is Paramount as Citizens Patiently Await the Outcome.” 2024. Accessed September 3, 2024. https://theorganiser.net/news/electoral-justice-as-pronounced-by-the-apc-leader-dr-samura-kamara-is-paramount-as-citizens-patiently-await-the-outcome/#google_vignette.
