Introduction

Twenty-four years after the 2001 Jos crisis,1 political, religious, and traditional elites have transformed historical memories of violence into weapons of electoral manipulation. In Plateau State, Central Nigeria, these elites systematically exploit ethno-religious tensions rooted in a history of indigene-settler dichotomy, convincing voters that patrimonial politics based on ethnic and religious identity supersedes competence and genuine development. As Falola2 argues, “narrative agency rests at the heart of political liberty and cultural sovereignty. Narratives determine who gets in and who remains out, what is desirable and what is dangerous.” Drawing on fieldwork in Jos North Local Government Area (LGA), this essay demonstrates how elites manipulate and amplify security threats while deflecting accountability for governance failures, undermining sustainable peace and democratic governance with implications for multi-ethnic democracies across Africa.

Colonial Origins and the Indigene-Settler Dichotomy

The manipulation of historical narratives along divisive lines in Plateau State has deep colonial roots. Between 1955 and 1958, the Berom Progressive Union (regarded as representing indigenes) campaigned for a paramount ruler, alleging that Hausa-dominated Native Authority institutions enacted unjust occupancy laws. When Rwang Pam was appointed Gbong Gwom3 Jos in 1947, Hausa migrants (regarded as non-indigenes) in the city mounted fierce opposition. The indigene-settler dichotomy intensified in 1994 when citizenship debates questioned the identity of Nigerians from diverse ethnic groups as equally belonging to their own country. Since then, elections have been contested through narratives of marginalization or constructing binaries of “indigenes” versus “settlers/non-indigenes,” while invoking memories of violent attacks.

The 2001 crisis exemplifies how elite actors frame a narrative of “us” versus “them” when using violence to mobilize support. Different groups have interpreted events through radically different lenses: as ethno-religious conflict,4 genocide,5 marginalization,6 or as part of an Islamization agenda.7

These elites who construct and deploy such historical narratives include political leaders, especially governors, local government officials, state and federal representatives, religious leaders such as bishops, priests, pastors, imams, and the Council of Ulama, as well as traditional chiefs and rulers, like the Gbong Gwom Jos and the Emir of Wase. They operate in an environment where fear, violence, and marginalization already exist. However, they exploit and magnify these pre-existing tensions and divisions by framing ethnic voting as the only solution, thereby shutting the door on other alternatives, such as security reform, reconciliation, or anti-corruption demands.

This shifts responsibility for poor governance and corruption away from the political elites; materially, they gain access to state resources, patronage networks, and immunity from scrutiny or accountability. Most importantly, the elites benefit from all ethnic groups: the more they mobilize the communities, the more likely they are to keep them underdeveloped, divided, insecure, and loyal.8 For example, under Governor Jonah Jang’s administration (2007-2015), this ethnic and religious manipulation rode high on anti-Hausa sentiments, while his administration was complicit in the electoral violence that erupted after the 2008 elections.9 The Justice Bola Ajibola Commission confirmed that government electoral manipulation and ethnic bias in election administration directly contributed to the 2008 local government crisis that resulted in the death of over 700 people.10

Institutional Mechanisms of Elite Control

Beyond ethnic mobilization, elites control institutional mechanisms: informal candidate vetting through religious bodies precedes party primaries. As the Ajibola Commission revealed, they influence the appointments of the electoral administration; government positions are allocated on the basis of ethnic quotas without accountability; and development resources are distributed by ethnic calculus rather than need. In this way, ethno-religious networks guide voting in a context where social media circulates decontextualized violence. Political parties tend to become ethnic rather than ideological organizations, making the ability to govern irrelevant to electoral outcomes.

Jos North LGA exemplifies the most extreme case. The area has held only four elections in 26 years (1999, 2008, 2021, 2024) due to inter-ethnic conflicts. Historical narratives shape electoral outcomes. Approximately 90% of Christian voters support the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), while Muslim voters generally support opposition parties, such as the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP). Elites have systematically exploited ethnic fears, turning democracy into ethnic competition. For instance, Governor Lalong’s controversies over Muslim appointments and Sheikh Jingir’s endorsement of Nentawe Yilwatda as the APC’s gubernatorial candidate triggered accusations of betrayal among Plateau State residents, who felt that an endorsement from a Muslim cleric equated to selling off their ethno-religious identities.11 This demonstrates how historical narratives have become inescapable political constraints.12

Pathways to Reform

Necessary Reforms:

Fundamental changes to mitigate elite manipulation should include federal security restructuring with minority representation, the constitutional removal of indigene-settler classifications, proportional representation to guarantee minority participation, independent anti-corruption bodies with international oversight, and land reform with transparent administration. Implementation requires external pressure—such as international donor conditionality, diaspora advocacy, and civil society litigation—rather than elite goodwill. However, these are long-term reforms (20-30 years) that require federal political will, which currently does not exist.

Reform Limitations:

Reforms alone are insufficient against persistent inter-ethnic tensions, violence, and compromised security. Voters may prioritize ethnic and religious protection over governance. Therefore, transforming the security sector, providing economic alternatives to patronage, implementing transitional justice, and shifting youth political expectations are essential. Without security guarantees and an active federal response, state-level reforms will fail to deliver on their promises.

Mobilization Strategy:

Mobilizing people for reform will be challenging because their voting choices reflect genuine fears of insecurity and a perceived sense of dominance. The strategy must validate these fears while showing that two decades of ethno-religious politics have not alleviated insecurity or improved livelihoods.

Reforms require building alternative movements, such as youth organizations demanding accountability from dominant elites, supporting women’s cooperatives that transcend ethno-religious differences, and professional associations focused on shared material interests. Initial efforts should prioritize low-risk cross-ethnic cooperation, such as market associations or infrastructure projects supported by international monitoring. Sustainable change will take decades, driven by youth frustration with economic stagnation, external pressure from international actors, and evidence that ethno-religious politics primarily serve the interests of the elite.

Conclusion

This study reveals that in Plateau State, pre-existing social cleavages have subverted democratic institutions through elite amplification of existing ethno-religious differences and insecurities. Jos North Local Government Area (LGA) exemplifies how, in the absence of proper security guarantees and constitutional safeguards, electoral democracy can become an arena for ethnic competition rather than genuine representation. Political, religious, and traditional elites have weaponized historically constructed identity-based differences to advance personal interests while communities face continuous insecurity and underdevelopment. Breaking this cycle requires federal security reform, constitutional restructuring, external pressure, and generational change that should span between 20-30 years. Without such comprehensive transformations and genuine reconciliation, historical manipulation will continue undermining sustainable peace.

Endnotes

  1. Umar Habila Dadem Danfulani and Sati U. Fwatshak, ‘Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos, Nigeria’, in African Affairs, vol. 101, no. 403, Oxford University Press, April 2002, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/101.403.243; International Crisis Group, ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis’, in Africa Report, no. 196 (2012), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/nigeria/196-curbing-violence-nigeria-i-jos-crisis.
  2. Toyin Falola, Narrative Power: Shaping Meaning, Identity, and Resistance – Toyin Falola Network, Articles, 13 August 2025, https://toyinfalolanetwork.org/narrative-power-shaping-meaning-identity-and-resistance/.
  3. The term refers to the paramount ruler or chief of the Berom people
  4. Danfulani and Fwatshak, ‘Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos, Nigeria’.
  5. Eghosa E. Osaghae and Rotimi T. Suberu, A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria (2005), Report number 6, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D/PDF/Outputs/Inequality/wp6.pdf.
  6. Adam Higazi, ‘Urban and Political Violence in Jos (Nigeria) from the Colonial Period to the 2007 Elections’, Politique Africaine 106, no. 2 (2007): 69, https://doi.org/10.3917/polaf.106.0069.
  7. Nelly Van Doorn-Harder, ‘On Not Throwing Stones: Christian and Muslim Conflict in Nigeria,’ The Christian Century, 8 February 2003, https://www.christiancentury.org/article/2003-02/not-throwing-stones; Jock Matthew Agai, ‘The Rise of Islamic Jihad in Northern Nigeria and Its Implications on the Jos-Plateau Religious Conflicts’, Social Sciences 3, no. 3 (2014): 67–73.
  8. Onyedikachi Madueke, ‘Ethnic Mobilisation and State Fragility in Nigeria: An Instrumentalist Perspective,’ National Identities 0, no. 0 (2025): 1–21, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2025.2566825.
  9. Philip Ostien, ‘Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria,’ Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa, 2009, 1–42, http://opus.ub.uni-bayreuth.de/schriftenreihen.php?la=de.
  10. Bola Ajibola, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances in Jos, Plateau State., Government Whitepaper (2008).
  11. Agabus Pwanagba, ‘Jos Main Market: Jos South Residents Reject Lalong, Jaiz Bank’s Rebuilding Plan,’ Daily Post Nigeria, 16 August 2022, https://dailypost.ng/2022/08/16/jos-main-market-jos-south-residents-reject-lalong-jaiz-banks-rebuilding-plan/.
  12. Achor Abimaje, As Masquerades Celebrate Victory of Governor-Elect in Plateau, Interview, 26 March 2023, https://leadership.ng/as-masquerades-celebrate-victory-of-governor-elect-in-plateau/.