International relations today are not built solely on history, power, or geography, but on the ability of state actors to redefine their position and role in a rapidly changing world.¹ In this context, the Baltic states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—have a rare strategic opportunity to reshape their international relations through engagements with Africa. They can do this not by extending traditional, longstanding, and existing European foreign policies, but as independent actors who build new partnerships outside the classic Western framework.

Western Dependence: A Comfortable Choice or a Strategic Constraint?

Since their independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Baltic states opted for full integration into the Western system politically and economically, and for security purposes.² However, this integration has gradually transformed into a kind of dependence, with the foreign policies of the Baltic states often reflecting the positions of the European Union (EU) or the United States of America (USA), rather than expressing their own national interests.³

But the global trend is no longer unidirectional. Africa, once considered a marginal player in the immediate post-Cold War period, has become an arena of fierce international competition between Western Powers, China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states.⁴ In this new scramble for Africa, the Baltic states appear to be almost absent, despite possessing significant assets that make them potentially beneficial partners for many African countries.

Foremost among such assets is the absence of an indispensable element in most of modern Europe: a colonial legacy. This absence of a colonial legacy in Africa grants the Baltic states a rare moral credibility in an international context burdened by the legacy of domination and exploitation.⁵ This is coupled with their accumulated experience in transitioning from closed, centralized systems to market economies and pluralistic democracies, an experience that resonates with the multiparty trajectories of numerous African countries.⁶ Furthermore, the Baltic states’ leadership (especially in Estonia) in the fields of digital transformation and e-government positions them well to offer practical and effective solutions to countries seeking to move beyond traditional development models.⁷ Their small size also grants them greater political flexibility and agility than the larger powers, who are constrained by bureaucracy and complex power balances. The unique geopolitical location of the Baltic states, between the East and West, also grants them an understanding of diverse governance and development models, positioning them to play a knowledge-based, potentially mediatory role to African partners seeking more balanced options in their international relations.

Africa’s growing economic potential, especially in vital minerals and emerging markets, can inspire policymakers on both sides to see this as a timely opportunity for strategic investment and optimism about future influence.

Africa Is Not on the Periphery: It Is a Center of Global Transformation 

It can be argued that Africa today is no longer merely a continent solely defined by its natural resource endowments or political crises.8 It is becoming a dynamic actor capable of potentially reshaping its position in the international political economy. The continent is undergoing profound economic and demographic transformations, with its population exceeding 1.4 billion and expected to double over the next few decades, making it one of the world’s largest future markets in terms of consumption and workforce.⁹ Recognizing Africa as a center of global transformation can motivate policymakers to view engagement as essential for future relevance and influence in international affairs. ¹⁰

This ongoing global transformation not only opens opportunities for major and emerging powers, but also for medium and small-sized countries seeking to expand their influence and international presence. Herein lies the advantageous position of the Baltic states: because they were not historically involved in the slave trade or colonialism, they have a moral advantage in an international system still burdened by the legacy of domination and mistrust.11 This fact is not merely symbolic; rather, it presents an opening for the Baltic states and Africa to build partnerships based on equality and mutual respect, something many African countries are seeking as they reassess their relationships with traditional major powers.

Africa is often framed as a strategic source of raw materials, particularly in the context of the global energy transition. However, this risks reproducing the dominant European model of engagement, historically characterized by extractive asymmetry and externalized value addition.12 A Baltic approach could differ by emphasizing cooperation beyond primary commodities, including digital governance, technological exchange, and human capital development.13Africa’s expanding digital ecosystems, demographic dynamism, and regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) suggest that it can function not only as a supplier of resources, but as a partner in emerging economic and technological value chains.14For the Baltic states, which seek to enhance their economic security and reduce their dependence on traditional supply chains, building stable relationships with African countries that produce these resources can serve as a strategic pillar of their economic future.

Furthermore, Africa represents a promising market for services and technology, aligning with the Baltic states’ strengths, especially in digital transformation, e-government, and cybersecurity. Instead of merely being recipients or subordinates in the European economy, these countries can become providers of knowledge and expertise to new markets, thereby enhancing their economic standing and granting them greater autonomy within the international system. Engagement with Africa will enable the Baltic states to diversify their foreign trade, fostering a sense of empowerment and strategic independence in a multipolar world.

The Soviet Legacy: From Burden to Tool for Understanding

Soviet domination of the Baltic states, which lasted from 1944 to 1991, is often viewed as a burdensome historical period to be forgotten, given the political and economic constraints and loss of sovereignty. This interpretation obscures potential aspects of reexamining this period of occupation from a functional and strategic standpoint. The Soviet legacy in the Baltic states is not simply a past to be discarded; it can be understood as a complex experience that informed the process of managing a profound transformation from a rigidly centralized system to an open-market economy, and from a closed political system to a pluralistic one based on competition and institutions.15

This history of invasion, occupation, and eventual independence—with its transitional shocks, structural reforms, and institutional rebuilding—bears a striking resemblance to the paths many African countries are currently navigating. Such African countries face similar challenges with state restructuring, building political legitimacy, navigating between stability and openness, and managing economic transformation in fragile, complex contexts.16 Therefore, the true value of historical legacy is understanding it as practical knowledge that can be transferred and adapted to other contexts.

On this basis, the Baltic states can present themselves on the international stage as actors with dual experience, combining their engagement with centralized models with their participation in liberal ones. This intermediate position gives them a unique ability to understand the complexities of transition, moving beyond abstract theoretical pronouncements often dominating Western discourse on Africa.17 The Baltic states do not need to offer a ready-made ideal model, but rather utilize their practical post-independence experience, with all its successes and failures, to be more realistic and adaptable to the African context.

This legacy of the Soviet occupation also gives the Baltic states a greater sensitivity to issues of sovereignty, self-reliance, and the risks of economic and political dependency—all central issues in contemporary African debates.18 This, in turn, can pave the way for a more balanced and realistic dialogue, based on the exchange of experiences rather than the imposition of models, and on partnership rather than tutelage. In this context, the Baltic states need not present themselves as sources of funding or technology, but as “partners who understand transformation” from within, grasp its complexities, and can offer support based on experience and accumulated knowledge. The value lies not in material resources but in historical experience that can support transformation in Africa.

Repurposing the Soviet legacy in the Baltic states does not mean justifying or glorifying it, but consciously transcending it, transforming it from a historical burden into a tool for understanding; a painful memory into a strategic resource that can enhance the Baltic states’ standing in a world seeking diverse models, not a single, replicated version of the Western experience.

Areas of Cooperation: What Can the Baltic States Offer?

Despite their small geographical and demographic size, the Baltic states possess a wealth of experience far exceeding their weight in the international system, enabling them to offer genuine value in partnerships with African countries. These states have not built their strength on natural resources or political influence, but rather on investment in knowledge, innovation, and restructuring the state to meet the demands of the digital age.

In this context, their experience in digital transformation stands out as a key area of excellence. Estonia, in particular, has developed an advanced e-government model based on efficiency, transparency, and easy access to public services. This experience is not merely a technological success but represents a shift in the philosophy of governance from traditional bureaucracy to agile digital administration.19 This aligns with the needs of many African countries seeking to overcome structural constraints that hinder institutional performance, without having to endure the lengthy processes undertaken by industrialized nations. The Baltic states also possess significant expertise in governance, institution-building, and transparency, which are central issues in African discussions on the state and development. Their transition from closed to more open systems represents an example of a complex process of rebuilding trust between the state and society.20 This makes their experience directly relevant to contexts seeking stability without sacrificing reform.

Furthermore, higher education presents a promising area for cooperation. The Baltic states can play a vital role in human capacity building through academic exchange programs, scholarships, and joint research initiatives, such as Erasmus+ mobility schemes, the Baltic University Programme, and national scholarship frameworks administered by institutions like the State Education Development Agency in Latvia or international initiatives such as the Baltic-American Freedom Foundation. The importance of this cooperation extends beyond knowledge transfer; it fosters long-term networks among academic and professional elites, contributing to strategic relationships transcending governments and reaching into societies.

This cooperation can be grounded in concrete areas where the Baltic states have already demonstrated global leadership, particularly Estonia’s internationally recognized e-governance model, cybersecurity architecture, and digital public services.21 Through institutions such as the e-Governance Academy, which has supported digital transformation projects worldwide, and through official export strategies targeting African markets, the Baltic states have actively promoted the transfer of expertise in cybersecurity, fintech, and digital governance as scalable, low-cost solutions tailored to emerging economies. This is precisely where the Baltic states’ advantage lies: they can offer effective, low-cost solutions compared to the cumbersome, complex Western models.

Despite the clarity of these capabilities, their translation into tangible reality remains limited. The first obstacle is the lack of an independent strategic vision among the Baltic states regarding Africa. The continent is still often included within the general frameworks of European foreign policy, without developing specific approaches that reflect the unique characteristics and potential of these countries.22 This lack of vision not only weakens initiatives but also limits the ability to build long-term relationships based on planning and continuity. The second obstacle relates to the limited diplomatic and economic presence of Baltic states and corporate organizations in Africa. Diplomatic representation and direct investment remain at modest levels, failing to reflect the scale of available opportunities and latent potential. In a world where relationships are shaped through direct presence and continuous interaction, absence or limited representation simply means a loss of influence.

The most profound obstacle to relations between Baltic African states lies in the continued perception of Africa through a traditional European lens, which reduces the continent to its developmental problems or crises rather than recognizing it as a diverse and complex space offering genuine strategic opportunities.23 This perspective not only influences policy but is also reflected in discourse and the way initiatives are designed, leading to the reproduction of outdated patterns of engagement.

Overcoming these obstacles requires rethinking Africa’s place within the Baltic states’ foreign policy priorities and shifting from a reactive, dependent approach to a more proactive and self-directed one. The potential is there, but turning it into reality depends on political will and the ability to develop a new vision that recognizes Africa as a strategic partner, rather than merely a geographic or political extension of others’ policies.

Outside the Shadow of the European Union: Towards a More Independent Policy

The pursuit of a more independent policy does not mean that the Baltic states will abandon their European affiliation or distance themselves from their commitments within the European Union.  On the contrary, this trend can be understood as an effort to strengthen their position within the European system by gaining greater autonomy and room for independent action. Power within large blocs is not measured solely by cohesion, but also by the ability of member states to make distinctive contributions that reflect their unique strengths and expand their external engagement.

Conclusion: The Window of Opportunity Will Not Remain Open for Long

The world today is not merely changing, but being simultaneously disrupted and transformed, where traditional hegemony is waning in favor of more complex and diverse power balances. Africa’s centrality to contemporary global transformations lies in the convergence of three structural dynamics: its rapidly expanding population, its concentration of strategic natural resources, and its growing integration into global trade and financial systems. Together, these factors position the continent not at the margins, but at the core of emerging patterns of economic competition, geopolitical contestation, and the reconfiguration of global power.

In this context, the Baltic states have a rare opportunity to redefine their position in a changing world. However, this opportunity will not remain open indefinitely. Other international powers are moving rapidly to consolidate their presence in Africa. If the Baltic states continue to hesitate, they risk missing a historic opportunity that will be difficult to recover later.

Endnotes

  1. Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
  2. Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, no. 3 (2001): 289–314, https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/25.3.289.
  3. John Ikenberry, The Liberal International Order and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).
  4. Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors (New York: Pantheon, 2009).
  5. Kristjan Vassil, ed., Estonian e-Government Ecosystem (Tallinn: e-Governance Academy, 2016), https://ega.ee/publication/estonian-e-governance-ecosystem/.
  6. Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built.
  7. Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
  8. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Economic Development in Africa Report 2024(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2025), noting that Africa’s growth averaged 4.8% in the 2000s, above the global average.
  9. World Bank, Africa’s Pulse, no. 32 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025). https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/10/07/sub-saharan-africa-maintains-resilient-growth-but-faces-urgent-jobs-challenge?utm_source=chatgpt.com
  10. Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).
  11. William Brown and Sophie Harman, African Agency in International Politics (London: Routledge, 2013).
  12. Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
  13. World Bank, Digital Economy for Africa Initiative (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020).
  14. World Bank, The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020).
  15. UN, World Population Prospects 2022, https://population.un.org/wpp/
  16. World Bank, Africa’s Pulse, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/africas-pulse
  17. Orenstein, Mitchell A. The Lands in Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
  18. Dovile Jakniunaite. “How Small States Become Security Actors: Lithuania’s Experience.” Journal of Baltic Studies, 2015.
  19. Kristjan Vassil, “Estonian e-Government Ecosystem: Foundation, Applications, Outcomes,” in World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016); Helen Margetts and Patrick Dunleavy, “The Second Wave of Digital-Era Governance,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 371, no. 1987 (2013).
  20. Libensons, Decolonisation: Baltic States and Africa: An Essay Comparing the Post-Colonial Policies of the Baltic and African Governments (2024), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/384746765.
  21. Kattel, R., & Mergel, I. (2019). Estonia’s digital transformation: Mission mystique and the hiding hand. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose Working Paper.
  22. Carbone, Maurizio. The European Union in Africa: Incoherent Policies, Asymmetrical Partnership, Declining Relevance? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013.
  23. Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).