Introduction

One of the major expectations of Ethiopia’s Transitional Justice (TJ) process in the context of post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction, and sustainable peace is that it will deliver justice to victims of conflict-related gender-based violence (CRGBV). While CRGBV continues unabated in the conflicts currently underway in different parts of Ethiopia,1 the region of Tigray has been particularly identified as the worst-case scenario. It is believed that this is one of the reasons why the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia formally adopted a TJ policy in the aftermath of the war between the government and the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).2 Yet, while the policy appears promising, its potential to meaningfully address one of the gravest legacies of the war – CRGBV – remains deeply troubling.

Understanding these limitations requires unpacking the unique challenges of addressing CRGBV in the post-conflict context. This process also includes examining how the design and political dynamics of the TJ framework shape and often constrain its contribution to sustainable peacebuilding.

Can CRGBV be effectively addressed in the Ethiopian context without credible prosecution for war crimes?

CRGBV is universally recognized as one of the most heinous crimes committed during wartime. International criminal law dictates that crimes such as rape, sexual slavery, and rape-related pregnancies cannot be simply amnestied or addressed through mere truth-telling processes, as they require full criminal prosecution.3

Addressing CRGBV through prosecution requires a prosecutorial design that is legitimate, trusted, and above all, victim-centered. In Ethiopia, the successful prosecution of perpetrators of CRGBV will require maintaining a balance between local ownership and national cohesion in prosecutorial action. This, in relation to the case of Tigray, means balancing the meaningful involvement of the region, where the vast majority of CRGBV violations occurred, on the one hand, with the role of the federal government and its institutions in recreating national coherence necessary for overseeing the prosecutorial component of TJ, on the other. As things stand, striking this balance is proving extremely difficult. The TJ framework in Ethiopia is currently structured to tilt in favor of granting overwhelming powers to the federal government, which risks undermining the legitimacy and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Design problems: A federalized process with little regional ownership

When we look closely at the framework of Ethiopia’s TJ, it becomes immediately clear that the process is almost entirely anchored at the federal level.4 While the Pretoria Agreement commits both the federal government and the TPLF to a “national” TJ process, this commitment has not translated into a mutually owned process by the two parties.

Federal institutions have dominated the TJ policy.5 Little or no input from Tigray was incorporated,6 in spite of the region being home to the survivors and victims that the process aims to serve. The five draft TJ policy implementation laws, currently under preparation by the Ministry of Justice, also reflect this exclusion. Investigations, prosecutions, and adjudication of core crimes, including CRGBV, are set to fall solely under federal authority.7 This also runs counter to the federal structure of the country, raising questions about whether such a highly centralized TJ process, with no regional involvement, can address certain war crimes that are intensely localized in their impact.

Political Mistrust and Conflicting Narratives

Beyond the design, the political environment further complicates Ethiopia’s pursuit of justice for victims of CRGBV. For instance, Tigray’s interim administration established its own Genocide Inquiry Commission,8 which has published several reports alleging widespread GBV, presenting alarmingly high numbers of victims. In one of its reports, the Commission explicitly described the national TJ process as partial, ineffective, and incapable of delivering justice.9 The federal government has never formally responded to, validated, or contested these findings.

Obviously, such open criticism weakens the legitimacy of any national TJ process, especially for victims who require trust that existing political tensions between the national government and the Tigray region will not overshadow their testimonies and suffering. Even if prosecutions proceed, serious practical barriers remain. For instance, under one of the draft implementation laws, cases of CRGBV are expected to be tried before a special bench established by the Federal Supreme Court, sitting in Addis Ababa. For CRGBV survivors living thousands of kilometers away in Tigray, participating in such proceedings in the capital city is nearly impossible. Most victims will not have the financial means, physical ability, or psychological readiness to travel repeatedly to Addis Ababa. Justice, therefore, becomes physically distant and symbolically inaccessible. A TJ process conducted far from the war-affected communities risks being seen as detached, abstract, and ultimately irrelevant to the survivors’ needs and rights.

Another core issue in the federal-led prosecutorial TJ process is that, when scrutinized within a TJ framework, it is somewhat contradictory. For example, members of the federal military and security forces who are allegedly suspected of committing some of the atrocities are also set to be investigated and prosecuted by federal institutions. This creates the perception in some circles of a contradictory situation: a system that asks victims to trust the same federal institutions implicated in their violation.

A middle path: Striking a delicate balance between regional involvement and federal authority

Despite these challenges, the solution cannot come by simply rejecting the federal TJ process, nor can it be rectified by fully devolving justice to a particular region.10 Local ownership without central oversight still risks undermining the TJ process. Of course, international mechanisms, which could have been ideal in some cases,11 have been politically made unrealistic, at least as far as the Pretorial agreement is concerned.

A constructive middle ground exists. Ethiopia’s TJ policy provides limited openings for regional involvement. And these can be meaningfully expanded through the implementing legislation currently at the drafting stage. Among others, allowing regions to meaningfully participate in the nomination and appointment of judges to the special bench handling prosecutions and in establishing joint federal-regional investigative teams, so that regional investigators can engage substantively in fact-finding and, hopefully, mitigate the federal prosecutorial chokehold on the TJ process. Furthermore, the special bench can be assigned to sit in the regional states, so that cases related to CRGBV can be adjudicated closer to victims and conflict-affected communities.

Conclusion

Although Ethiopia’s TJ process holds significant potential, its current design, which is highly centralized, politically contested, and institutionally distrusted, poses a serious hurdle in providing succor to the victims of CRGBV. Survivors need a justice system that is accessible, credible, and reflective of the realities of their victimhood. Without the integration of regional participation and a willingness to confront political mistrust head-on, Ethiopia risks building a TJ prosecutorial framework that looks robust on paper but is capable of failing the very people it claims to serve.

Endnotes

  1. BBC News. “Amhara Conflict: Thousands of Reports of Rape and Assault.” BBC Audio, November 20, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/audio/play/p0mhv46b.

  2. African Union. Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Pretoria, South Africa, 2022. https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf.

  3. Gaggioli, Gloria. “Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Violation of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law.” International Review of the Red Cross 96, no. 894 (2014): 503–38.

  4. Addis Standard. “Editorial: Despite Concerns, Ethiopia Advances Transitional Justice, Imperiling Path to Genuine Justice and Reconciliation. A Call for Reflection and Revision!” Addis Standard, 2024. https://addisstandard.com/despite-concerns-ethiopia-advances-transitional-justice-imperiling-path-to-genuine-justice-and-reconciliation-a-call-for-reflection-and-revision/.

  5. Endale, Ashenafi. “Tigray Officials Demand Redesigned Transitional Justice Model.” The Reporter Ethiopia, 2023. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/36717/.

  6. [Statement — not a citation] While the non-participation of Tigray cannot be entirely blamed on the federal government, that still does not change the fact of non-participation and lack of inclusivity.

  7. Addis Standard. “Justice Ministry to Approve Transitional Justice Implementation Directives within Three Months.” Addis Standard, December 11, 2024. https://addisstandard.com/justice-ministry-to-approve-transitional-justice-implementation-directives-within-three-months/.

  8. Tigray Interim Administration. A Proclamation to Establish the Tigray Genocide Inquiry Commission and Determine Its Powers and Responsibilities, Proclamation No. 362/2014. Tigray Negarit Gazetta.

  9. Yoseph, Nardos. “Tigray Genocide Inquiry Commission Blasts Transitional Justice Process for Inefficacy, Partiality.” The Reporter Ethiopia, 2025. https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/47457/.

  10. Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Report of the EHRC/OHCHR Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by All Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia. 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3947207?ln=en&v=pdf.

  11. Metekia, Tadesse Simie, and Beza Dessalegn. “Ethiopia’s Transitional Justice: Tensions Around International Experts’ Role Need Swift Resolution.” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, 2024. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ethiopia-s-transitional-justice-tensions-around-international-experts-role-need-swift-resolution.