Introduction

Islam worldwide is broadly divided into two categories: the majority, Sunni Muslims, and the minority, Shia Muslims. The Islamic Movement (Harkar Musulunci), or Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), is the most significant Shia movement in Nigeria, with an estimated ten to fifteen million followers.1 There are other Shia organisations, such as Rasul A’azam Foundation (RAAF), based in Kano.2 The IMN started as a Sunni-led students’ movement in the late 1970s, under its charismatic leader, Shaykh Ibrahim Yakubu El-Zakzaky.3 Their goal was (and remains) the establishment of an Islamic government. What began as admiration of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, gradually transformed into the adoption of Shia Islam.

Over the years, the IMN has been targeted by the Nigerian security forces for the sect’s Islamic activism through public processions (muzahara) and protests. In the 1990s, a massive crackdown on the movement was carried out by the military regime of General Sani Abacha. The most fatal incident in the history of the movement was the 2015 Zaria Massacre. Between December 12 and December 14, about 348 Shias,4 or about 1000, according to other sources,5 were killed by the Nigerian Army (NA). The carnage followed the alleged blockage of the road during an IMN hoisting of the flag ceremony to celebrate the coming Rabi’ul Awwal, the birth month of the Prophet and third in the Islamic Calendar. The NA claimed that the IMN members attempted to assassinate its Chief of Staff, Lt. General Tukur Burutai, who was allegedly prevented from plying the road to attend the Passing Out Parade Ceremony of the 73rd regular recruits of the army. Consequently, troops were deployed to open up the road forcefully. In the melee that followed, some Shia protesters lost their lives, and the military demolished several IMN buildings, including the residence of El-Zakzaky, who was arrested and put behind bars until 2021.6

The Abuja Struggle

The detention of El-Zakzaky sparked demonstrations and protests by his followers all over the country, calling for his release. In early 2016, his followers decided to take their grievances right to the Nigerian seat of power — the Capital city, Abuja. Confrontations between protesters and the security forces in the capital were virtually unheard of before 2016.7 However, with the commencement of what the IMN calls the Abuja Struggle — daily processions and protests on the streets of Abuja calling for the release of El-Zakzaky — the capital city became a new theatre of confrontation and bloodshed. Abuja now dwarfs other Nigerian cities such as Zaria, Kano, Bauchi, and Potiskum, which were previously the main sites of clashes. Thus, the geography of violence was expanded.

The daily Shia protests attracted the wrath of the security forces. Although there is no statistical data on the number of casualties or frequency of clashes, several cases of confrontation were recorded in each year between 2016 and 2021. On April 24, 2019, the Shia protesters forcefully opened the gates of the National Assembly during their protest, but no casualty was recorded.8 However, on July 10, 2019, an attempt to enter the National Assembly ended in violence involving IMN protesters and security operatives.9

The most fatal encounter occurred on October 29, 2018, when Nigerian security forces fired on a procession of Shia protesters in Abuja. This resulted in the killing of 59 Shias. According to IMN sources, approximately 109 protesters sustained injuries, and 156 were arrested.10 However, the Nigerian Army claimed that only three persons lost their lives and four soldiers were wounded.

On that day, the attempt of Shias to enter Abuja during their Arba’een pilgrimage was thwarted by the police and army. Arba’een, the largest Shia gathering in the world, is organised by the Shia in Iraq to commemorate 40 days after the killing of the third Shia Imam, Hussain Ibn Ali (grandson of the Prophet Muhammad), which occurred at Karbala (now in Iraq) on Huharram in 680 AD. The IMN previously organized its local version of the pilgrimage in Zaria but relocated activities to Abuja since the beginning of the Abuja Struggle.

Another most fatal encounter occurred, once more, in Abuja, on July 22, 2019. In the process, the Deputy Commissioner of Police in Charge of Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was shot dead. On July 26, 2019, the IMN was proscribed by the Federal Government of Nigeria.11 This made the movement more vulnerable to frequent attacks by the security forces.

Even after the release of El-Zakzaky in 2021, violent confrontations continued. Clashes were recorded in August 2024 and March 2025, during the Arba’een pilgrimage and Quds Day processions, respectively. After his release, El-Zakzaky decided to settle in Abuja. This decision is partly informed by the strategic location of the capital and the effectiveness of the IMN’s struggle in proximity to the federal seat of power. El-Zakzaky’s stay in Abuja implies that all the activities of his followers are now centred in the capital.

The Causes of Violent Confrontations

The IMN rejects the use of the words “confrontation” or “clash” to describe the violence resulting from their religious activism. They claim that the security forces target them to dissuade other Nigerians from joining their movement.12 The Shia have a conviction that they are fighting injustice, and they have, over the years, developed unlimited loyalty to their leader, for whom they are ready to die, partly because of the sacrifices he has made for the movement. For instance, he spent nine years in prison in the 1980s and 1990s.13 He also lost six sons to the security forces in raids in 2014 and 2015 during Quds Day demonstrations and the Zaria Massacre, respectively. In the latter incident, he sustained bullet injuries alongside his wife, with whom he spent almost six years in prison from 2015 to 2021.

The primary source of violent confrontations has been the IMN procession, particularly during the Abuja Struggle. Demonstrations are seen as a potent tool for pressuring the government to release El-Zakzaky from detention. The IMN believes that it was the pressure from the Free-Zakzaky demonstrations that forced the government to take him to court, as his whereabouts were initially unknown.14 The IMN members are also of the strong belief that their forceful entry into the National Assembly on April 24, 2019, compelled the government to allow doctors from the London-based Islamic Human Rights Commission to examine their leader.15 Those killed are seen as martyrs.

The defiance and disobedience of the IMN to the constituted authority during their protests, and the violent reaction of the security forces, are the main drivers of violence. Although government security officers at times exhibit some level of restraint, others use excessive force and engage in extra-judicial killings when responding to the IMN protests.

Conclusion

The 2015 Zaria Massacre and the demolition of El-Zakzaky’s residence had unintended consequences. Starting with the Abuja Struggle, the IMN gradually made Abuja the centre of its activities – and the new face of confrontations with the security forces. The decision of El-Zakzaky to stay in Abuja after his release attracted a large number of his followers to the capital city. The daily processions have popularized the movement. Its constant clashes with the security forces have also attracted both the wrath and, at times, the sympathy of the residents.

Interestingly, for the first time since 2015, during the Ashura procession held nationwide in July 2025,16 there was no case of confrontation between the IMN and Nigerian security forces. The security forces have shown a high level of restraint. However, the effectiveness of the new approach to Nigerian security can only be fully assessed during the Arba’een pilgrimage in Abuja in August 2025. It is high time the Nigerian security forces explore non-kinetic methods in dealing with the movement. The use of excessive force has been the primary response of the state to Shia protests since the 1980s. As a result, state repression in northern Nigeria has been a driver of violence rather than a solution to insecurity. The government should adopt constructive engagement and dialogue, especially with the leader of the movement, who enjoys absolute loyalty from his followers, as a veritable tool for ensuring peace.

Endnotes

  1. Caterina Aiena, Communication to the ICC Prosecutor: The Attack against the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (London: Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2016), 11.
  2. Kabiru Haruna Isa and Sani Yakubu Adam, “The Shia and its Factions in Nigeria: The Case-Study of Kano,” ARIA 12, no. 1 (2014): 61–68.
  3. Sani Yakubu Adam, “Shia Processions and the Competition for Religious Public Space in Northern Nigeria 1980–2015,” in Proceedings of the Second Annual International Conference on Shi’i Studies, London, The Islamic College (London: ICAS Press, 2016), 210–213.
  4. Kaduna State Government, Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between the Islamic Movement in Nigeria and the Nigerian Army in Zaria (July 2016), XV.
  5. Aiena, Communication to the ICC Prosecutor, 14.
  6. Kabiru Haruna Isa and Sani Yakubu Adam, “A History of Shia and Its Development in Nigeria: The Case-Study of Kano,” Journal for Islamic Studies 36 (2017): 251–53.
  7. Interview with Aliyu Sambo, conducted by the author, July 23, 2025.
  8. Leke Baiyewu and Adelani Adepegba, “Shi’ites Storm National Assembly, Force Reps to Adjourn Plenary,” Punch, April 25, 2019, https://punchng.com/shiites-storm-nassembly-force-reps-to-adjourn-plenary/.
  9. Ronald Mutum et al., “DCP, Corps Member, Others Killed as Police Shiites Clash,” Daily Trust, July 23, 2019, https://dailytrust.com/dcp-corps-member-others-killed-as-police-shiites-clash/.
  10. Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), Da’awar Harkar Musulunci (Cibiyar Wallafa, 2020), 384–88.
  11. Evelyn Okakwu, “Nigeria Govt Secures Court Order to Proscribe Shiite IMN,” Premium Times, July 27, 2019, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/343322-nigeria-govt-secures-court-order-to-proscribe-shiite-imn.html?tztc=1.
  12. Interview with Sulaiman Gambo, conducted by the author, July 23, 2025.
  13. Interview with Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, conducted by Nagarta Radio, n.d.
  14. Al-Mizan, “Tsare Shaikh Zakzaky: Kwana Dubu ba Wasa ba,” Zhulhijjah 27, 1439, 1 and 5.
  15. Baiyewu and Adepegba, “Shi’ites Storm National Assembly.”
  16. Ashura is the 10th of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar. For Sunni Muslims, Ashura symbolizes the salvation of Moses and the Israelites by crossing the Red Sea. They observe supererogatory fasting on that day, following the practice of the Prophet Muhammad. For the Shia, it is a day of mourning for the commemoration of the killing of Husayn, the third Shia Imam, at Karbala. The IMN members engage in mourning from the 1st to the 9th of Muharram through a range of activities. Then, on the 10th, they hold nationwide processions to raise awareness about the significance of Ashura in Islamic history.

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