On February 5, 2025, President Ruto signed a Presidential Decree in Wajir, a county in northeastern Kenya, effectively abolishing a decades-old security vetting process that has disproportionately impacted Kenyan Somalis and other border communities seeking national identity cards.1 The President noted that:

“We want the people of northern Kenya to feel equal to the rest of the country, ” proclaimed Ruto. “All Kenyan children are equal. No Kenyan is greater than another.”

The extra-layer vetting is rooted in the post-independence security measures implemented by the Kenyan government following Somali irredentist claims, which were fought for in the Shifta War, 1963-1967. The Shifta War was a secessionist conflict in which ethnic Somalis in northern Kenya sought to join Somalia. This aspiration was part of the ‘Greater Somalia’ vision or Pan-Somalia nationalism at the time. Following the War, the Kenyan government instituted stringent measures aimed at distinguishing its Somali citizens from their kith and kin in neighboring states. This policy has been in place for over sixty years.

The President’s decision to scrap the decades-long security vetting process for Kenyan Somalis seeking national identity cards has received mixed reactions. While it has been hailed by government-leaning political elites as an effort to remedy the historical marginalization of residents of Kenya’s northeastern region, others perceive the directive as a political maneuver in the wake of Ruto’s declining political fortunes and waning popularity.

Ordinarily, youths applying for national IDs in northern Kenya borderlands are expected to provide additional documents, including national identity documents of their grandparents, and undergo stringent vetting by a committee composed of local national government administrators, security personnel, and village elders, among others. This process, while originally expected to eliminate non-local applicants, is often mired in corruption and lengthy delays, and has been decried by locals as entrenching ethnic and religious profiling of northern Muslim-majority citizens.2 This, in essence, cemented a policy of institutionalized marginalization, seclusion, and ethnic profiling.

A 2023 study by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) examined how digital ID systems in Africa, including Kenya, often exacerbated inequalities when historical biases are embedded in administrative processes.3 In northeastern Kenya, the vetting process became a symbol of distrust and state exclusion, and could have fueled local youth’s tendency to join violent extremist groups. For over 60 years, residents of northern counties like Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa have undergone additional security screening at checkpoints mounted along the road by multi-agency teams.

Ruto’s order aligns with Kenya’s 2010 Constitution, which guarantees equal treatment and citizenship rights. Article 12 ensures every citizen’s entitlement to identity documents, while Article 27 prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity or region. Advocates of equal citizenship rights have long argued that the vetting process violated these principles by imposing an unequal burden on Kenyan Somalis.

The decision to remove the additional ID vetting for Kenyan Somalis comes at a time when President Ruto has been facing increased domestic pressure over his handling of the country’s domestic affairs. Last year, the country experienced nationwide youth protests dubbed the Generation Z (Gen Z) protests,4 after the government introduced increased taxes through the Finance Bill 2024.

Ruto rode to power on the hustler tag – a rhetorical narrative contrasting himself with the country’s political dynasties. He styled himself as the champion of the plight of the downtrodden youth, mama mboga (vegetable sellers), and bodaboda riders (motorcycle taxi riders). His hustler narrative promised a bottom-up economic model. The nationwide protests, primarily driven by economic frustrations and organized through social media, went on to demand more than a repeal of the Finance Bill. The protests reignited a national conversation on deep-rooted governance issues that have long plagued the country. President Ruto has now gotten into an agreement with long-time opposition leader Raila Odinga in an attempt to stabilize his government, which continues to lose popularity after adding key Raila allies into his broad-based government a few months ago, a move driven by elite self-preservation amid surging public outcry.5

The new identity card policy shift can also be interpreted as a political strategy to win over the Kenyan Somali constituency in preparation for the 2027 general elections. The President has lost important voting blocs, such as the vote-rich central Kenya constituency, following the impeachment of Vice President Rigathi Gachagua, who played a crucial role in his 2022 election victory. Kenyan politics has historically been structured around ethnic mobilization and coalitions.6 Kenyan Somalis form a significant voting bloc, with 2022 data indicating that the three majority Somali counties of Garissa, Wajir, and Mandera have over 600,000 registered voters.7 This, in addition to those in the capital, Nairobi, makes a considerable voting bloc.

However, the policy shift raises questions about compliance with security-related legislation, such as the Registration of Persons Act (Cap 107),8 which mandates proof of birth and parental citizenship for ID issuance. Ruto emphasized that vetting would persist but be standardized and localized, relying on local chiefs and biometric technology rather than Nairobi-based committees.

The removal of secondary vetting sparked heated debates around security concerns, particularly given Kenya’s proximity to Somalia, where Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat.9 Kenya’s northeastern borders have historically been porous, with Al-Shabaab exploiting the existing grievances among Somali, including ethnic and religious profiling, to garner sympathy and infiltrate the country, as evidenced by the 2013 Westgate Mall and 2015 Garissa University attacks.10

Ruto’s policy intersects with broader debates about citizenship and nation-building in Kenya. Kenya’s treatment of Kenyan Somalis reflects a historical tension between territorial sovereignty and ethnic diversity; a legacy of colonial boundary-making and cross-border belonging and cultural affinities. By abolishing the additional vetting, Ruto challenges this paradigm, aligning with postcolonial efforts to forge an inclusive national identity. However, such reforms must be accompanied by robust administrative capacity to avoid increased insecurity.

Ruto likely stands to gain traction in the northeast, potentially reshaping electoral dynamics, but there is a risk that it could lead to security concerns. This debate reflects a deeper national question of Kenyan Somali identity and belonging, citizenship, and national inclusion. Over the years, Kenyan Somalis have carefully negotiated their Kenyan identity through elite business enterprises and elite political positions in the government. The more than six-decade-long securitization of the Kenyan Somalis by the Kenyan government has undermined their citizenship rights. Ruto’s reform intends to challenge this, but the timing of the policy shift makes it appear like a decision based on political expediency. While this policy shift presents progress in citizenship rights, behind this could be a strategic effort to secure votes in his 2027 re-election bid.11

President Ruto’s removal of national ID vetting for Kenyan Somalis addresses a historical injustice rooted in post-Shifta War paranoia and war against terrorism,12 aligning with Kenya’s constitutional ethos of equality. However, it raises legitimate security concerns in a region that has suffered greatly from terrorism. While he seeks to resolve a historical injustice regarding Kenyan Somali citizenship, Ruto’s overtures carry a political goal, which, if not carefully executed, will have long-term security implications.

Endnotes

  1. The Presidency, Republic of Kenya. “Government Ends Extra Vetting for ID Registration in Border Counties.” July 27, 2025. https://www.president.go.ke/government-ends-extra-vetting-for-id-registration-in-borders-counties/
  2. Kerrow, Billow. “Vetting of Somalis for IDs Discriminatory, Must End.” Daily Nation (Kenya), February 7, 2025. https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/blogs/vetting-of-somalis-for-ids-discriminatory-must-end–4916456
  3. Musoni, Melody, Ennatu Domingo, and Elvis Ogah. Digital ID Systems in Africa: Challenges, Risks and Opportunities. Discussion Paper No. 360. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, December 2023. https://ecdpm.org/application/files/5517/0254/4789/Digital-ID-systems-in-Africa-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-360-2023.pdf
  4. Nowrojee, Binaifer. “How Kenya’s President Broke the Social Contract.” Foreign Policy, June 28, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/28/kenya-protests-ruto-imf-taxes-poverty-broke-social-contract/
  5. Gathara, Patrick. “Kenya’s Handshake Politics: Elite Self-Preservation Disguised as Compromise.” Al Jazeera, March 21, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/3/21/kenyas-handshake-politics-elite-self-preservation-disguised-as-compromise
  6. Wandera, Vivianne. “Kenya’s Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua’s Impeachment: Why It Matters.” Al Jazeera, October 18, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/18/kenya-deputy-president-rigathi-gachaguas-impeachment-why-it-matters
  7. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. Registered Voters per County/Constituency/CAW for the 2022 General Election. Nairobi: IEBC, 2022. https://www.iebc.or.ke/registration/?Statistics_of_Voter_2022
  8. Government of Kenya, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. Registration of Persons Act, CAP 107. Nairobi, September 2024. https://www.interior.go.ke/sites/default/files/2024-09/14.%20Registration%20of%20Persons%20Act%20CAP%20107.pdf
  9. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. Kenya–Somalia Border: Rising al‑Shabaab Threat in the Wake of ATMIS Drawdown. Special Report. September 1, 2023. https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/
  10. Wakube, Christopher, Thomas Nyagah, James Mwangi, and Larry Attree. Inside Kenya’s War on Terror: Breaking the Cycle of Violence in Garissa. Saferworld, 2017. https://www.saferworld-global.org/long-reads/inside-kenyaas-war-on-terror-breaking-the-cycle-of-violence-in-garissa
  11. Africa Confidential, “Ruto Shifts from Populism to Authoritarianism,” vol. 66, no. 15, July 25, 2025, https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15579/ruto-shifts-from-populism-to-authoritarianism.
  12. Keren Weitzberg, “Rethinking the Shifta War Fifty Years after Independence: Myth, Memory, and Marginalization,” in Kenya After 50, vol. African Histories and Modernities (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 65–81, doi:10.1057/9781137558305_4.
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