Political and security implications of public reactions to unconstitutional changes of government in (West) Africa: The curious case of Burkina Faso

In the run-up of activities leading up to the 50th anniversary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and the Conflict Research Network (CORN) – West Africa, organised a high-level policy dialogue from 15-16 April in Accra, Ghana, on “Understanding the Geopolitical and Strategic Changes in West Africa: Emerging Challenges and the Future of ECOWAS.” During the event, I spoke on a panel on “Conflict Transformation, Development and Peace in West Africa”, discussing, inter alia, perceptions of tacit public acceptance of unconstitutional changes of government/power (UCGs) and their impact on such transitions. Amid the evolving political situation in the Sahel, information networks have played a pivotal role in fueling mass protests and uprisings across West Africa. In light of this, I reflect in this piece on the array of public responses to UCGs, and what they mean for regional security in West Africa today. My analysis draws on a scoping of online local and international news, social media headlines, and conversations, based on the concept of these spaces as digital publics.

Context

West Africa has been in something of a tailspin since Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, founders of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, broke ranks with the regional body, ECOWAS, in January 2025. The rupture was the culmination of successive unconstitutional changes of government and power in all three countries, accounting for almost half of the seven military coups occurring in West Africa since 2020. Each coup was preceded by decades of democratic decline, characterized by tenure extensions of democratically elected leaders, numerous human rights abuses, and clampdowns on the freedoms of speech and assembly among dissenting voices.¹

Domestically, perceptions of popular support for the coupists have been at the core of speculations about the prospects for the return to constitutional government within the AES. However, rapid upswells in external endorsements of Burkinabe head of state, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, in recent weeks–likened to a cult following²–necessitate consideration of the security implications of this trend for the subregion.

Contextualising narratives of popular support

Traoré’s seizure of power in Burkina Faso in September 2022, the country’s second military coup that year, was met with media reports of widespread jubilation.³ The young strongman was celebrated as a hero for disrupting a succession of regimes seen as inept by the Burkinabe public.

More than two years later, this narrative is being stoked through high praise for Traoré’s ‘radical reforms’⁴, notably in the areas of the economy⁵, energy⁶, public infrastructure⁷, food security,⁸ and cultural and national pride.⁹ While he has made investments in these areas, claims of free maternal health¹⁰ and free education¹¹ policies have proven to be false, revealing the risks of misinformation¹⁰ and disinformation.¹¹ A large part of Traoré’s radicality is attributed to his expulsion of French military forces, rejection of the CFA Franc, and termination of exploitative mining and other agreements.

Multiple social media users across the world, largely youth and seemingly non-Burkinabe, are hailing Traoré as a transformative leader who is showing how decisive governance can trigger tangible development that serves national interests:

Traoré is being hailed as a nationalist and Pan-Africanist visionary for his rhetoric and actions evoking African pride and autonomy, with some of his supporters likening him to the much-respected revolutionary Burkinabe leader, the late Captain Thomas Sankara (albeit overlooking the divergence in their personas and intervening circumstances).¹² Traoré has fueled the comparison, claiming he came to “finish what Sankara started.” More recently, he has said that his leadership is not a democracy but a progressive popular revolution.¹³

A widening transnational support base

Pan Africanist rhetoric features significantly in calls by the South African nationalist and communist group, the Economic Freedom Fighters, for Africans and people of African descent to mobilize in defense and support of Traoré and African sovereignty.¹⁴

One Instagram user posted: ‘Chale. I just love Ibrahim Traoré. He is the future of Africa. Young people, be like #traore okay?’

This followed recent media reports of inflammatory remarks attributed to US Africa Command (AFRICOM)’s commander, General Michael Langley, claiming ‘their gold reserves are just in exchange to protect the junta regime’, instead of meeting citizens’ needs.¹⁵ Made in a US Senate committee hearing in April, the remarks are eerily reminiscent of the rhetoric that preceded deadly foreign military interventions in Libya and Iraq.

In early May, this escalated into solidarity mobilizations in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia,¹⁶ Jamaica,¹⁷ and the Sahelian diaspora¹⁸ with thousands marching under the call, “Hands Off the AES!” and “We Are All Traoré.” Further solidarity marches are planned in the coming weeks. Led by grassroot organizations and people’s movements, protesters strongly denounced external interference in Burkina Faso’s internal affairs, expressing support for the Traoré-led resistance against ‘imperialist destabilization.’

Both explicitly and implicitly, such calls and moves reveal two key poles in ongoing debates. On one hand, people are questioning the efficacy of the constitutional mode of governance many West Africans have been socialized to believe is in our best interests. This is juxtaposed with underlying ideas about an intrinsically ‘bad’ military government in Burkina Faso contrarily yielding positive, tangible results being celebrated by publics across the world.

Growing disillusionment with democracy is being amplified by the global north’s historical role as self-appointed arbiter of democratic correctness and its double standards in democracy enforcement.

Traoré has thus become the unwitting and unlikely catalyst of a growing trans-African uprising, potentially on the scale of the North African ‘Spring’ of 2010, against unproductive constitutional government and a global resurgence of neo-Pan-Africanism. But beyond bruising the egos of ‘establishment’¹⁹ African leaders and unsettling the global north’s diverse agendas for Africa, what does all this mean for governance and security in West Africa?

Critiques: The other side of the coin

It is worth noting, contrary to the above narratives suggesting growing support for Traoré’s government, that not everyone is a fan of unconstitutional governments. Some have expressed cynicism based on the trajectories of past military regimes and the sense of Deja vu evoked by ongoing events:

‘It all starts good until u check 30yrs later and realize he is still the leader of the country. That’s state capture. They’ll begin as revolutionary to win the hearts of people but as time goes on, they start acting [like] God and oppress their people.’ Source: X

Observers who push this narrative critique what appears to be the darker side of Traoré’s leadership: alleged violent repression of critics and independent voices, and alleged citizens’ abuse by the Burkinabe army, leading to an atmosphere of fear, ‘tension and uncertainty.’²⁰ While some have denounced these reports as underhanded attempts to soil the image of Traoré and the Burkinabe government, there is no denying the presence of tensions leading to, and emanating from, reported repeated coup attempts since Traoré came to power.

It is unclear whether the reports of multiple alleged coup attempts²¹ against the Traoré regime, with the latest in mid-April, are the result of internal dissent or externally-sponsored attempts to end his tenure. His bodyguard was reportedly offered US$5 million to assassinate Traoré recently, suggesting that subversive forces could be secretly trying to eliminate him.

What is clear is there is no single story here. The diversity of views in and outside Burkina Faso²² shows that reactions to Traoré’s leadership are complex, bifurcated, and fluid, and must be considered holistically in order to get a full picture view of public pulses and be able to respond appropriately.

Analysis of security implications

Locally, rising mistrust driven by repeated attempts to oust Traoré is already compromising the national response²³ to violent extremism. Security intelligence reveals that attacks are intensifying amid the security vacuum created by continuous reshufflings in the security sector, all aimed at protecting the regime. The targeting of Peul²⁴ civilians by militias working alongside the regime is seen as potentially eroding popular support for Traoré. The ongoing massive military expansion is likely to compound decades-old unresolved tensions within the security sector.²⁵

Regionally, Burkina Faso’s security lapses are deepening insecurity risks in neighboring countries, which have reported unmanned shared borders.²⁶ This will further deteriorate the already weak security collaborations that are so keenly needed to withstand shared threats.

Politically, we will likely see a widening contagion effect as solidarity protests spread. Nigerian security officers reportedly arrested activists alleged to be planning a Traoré support rally on 3 May, ²⁷ while protests are rumored in Ghana, South Africa, and at French consulates globally.²⁸ It will be recalled that Traoré reportedly received the ‘loudest applause’²⁹ of all 21 attending African heads of state during Ghanaian president John Mahama’s inauguration in Accra on 7 January, 2025.  Analysts are interpreting this alongside early responses to the coup as indicative of a growing trend of tolerance for military rule in Africa, especially among the youth. As one X user wrote: ‘Captain Ibrahim Traoré is the most beloved leader on the continent by the youths. He is the face of hope, of what Africa can be.’

Coupled with the ambivalent responses of regional bodies, from ECOWAS to AES’ defection, expanding support for Traoré could inspire similar takeovers in other countries. Given the current popular mood ranging from apathy to frustration at the failures of constitutional governance in the region, this may contribute towards more instability, or send West Africa into a democratic unravelling that would take decades to untangle.

There is also the ever-present specter of armed intervention, whether by an insurgency or an externally-backed coup.

Conclusion

If anything, evolving narratives around the Traoré regime are proving to be inaccurate measures of the relevance and responsiveness of military governments to the needs of the people they purport to serve. This is especially clear in light of emerging evidence of robust propaganda machineries operating both within and outside Burkina Faso that make it difficult, yet imperative, to filter truth from fabrication. It is worth noting that the loudest voices in the pro-Traoré campaign appear to be outside the country, with no tangible knowledge of the daily lived realities on the ground.

As one X user posted, ‘Captain Traoré is no longer an individual but an IDEA.’ Could this be an idea that has outgrown reality, but is being upheld by popular aspirations for more integrous leadership being projected onto a mirage? Time will tell.

In the interim, political duty bearers would do well to pay close attention to diverse and evolving narratives, and work hard to counter the rampant disinformation and propaganda on multiple sides of this debate.

Endnotes

1. Titilope F. Ajayi, Simbarashe Gukurume, & Ibrahim Bangura. “Strengthening Democratic Governance and Political Stability in Africa: Critical Policy Perspectives,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), December 22, 2022. https://www.accord.org.za/publication/strengthening-democratic-governance-and-political-stability-in-africa-critical-policy-perspectives/.
2. Ebenezer Obadare. “The Cult of Traoré,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/blog/cult-traore.
3. The French-language Editorial Team of DW. “Burkina: Transition Partie Durer Encore Cinq Ans?,” Deutsche Welle, May 27, 2024. https://www.dw.com/fr/burkina-transition-partie-durer-encore-cinq-ans/a-69190752.
4. Enoch Randy Aikins. “In Burkina Faso, Traoré’s Legacy Could Extend Beyond Popularity and Promises,” Institute for Security Studies Africa, April 24, 2025. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/in-burkina-faso-traore-s-legacy-could-extend-beyond-popularity-and-promises.
5. Steve Lalla. “Burkina Faso Nationalizes UK Goldmines,” Monthly Review Online, September 13, 2024. https://mronline.org/2024/09/13/burkina-faso-nationalizes-uk-goldmines/.
6. Martins Eze. “Ghana and Burkina Faso Sign Energy and Security Deals,” The Electricity Hub, March 14, 2025. https://theelectricityhub.com/ghana-and-burkina-faso-sign-energy-and-security-deals/.
7. Editorial Team of Agence Afrique. “Le Projet Routier Faso-Mebo Lancé par le Président Traoré Reçoit son Premier Lot d’Équipements,” Agence Afrique, March 28, 2025. https://www.agenceafrique.com/59413-le-projet-routier-faso-mebo-lance-par-le-president-traore-recoit-son-premier-lot-dequipements.html.
8. Ayo Oyoze Baje. “Lessons from Traoré’s Achievements in Agriculture,” BusinessDay Nigeria, January 26, 2025. https://businessday.ng/agriculture/article/lessons-from-traores-achievements-in-agriculture/.
9. Kwaku Krobea Asante. “Yes, Burkina Faso Is Adopting Traditional Cloth as Fabric for School Uniforms,” Fact-Check Ghana, August 14, 2023. https://www.fact-checkghana.com/yes-burkina-faso-is-adopting-traditional-cloth-as-fabric-for-school-uniforms/.
10. Cintia A. “Ibrahim Traoré Did Not Announce Free Maternity Services for Pregnant Women,” Lebledparle, April 7, 2025. https://www.lebledparle.com/en/fact-checking-ibrahim-traore-did-not-announce-free-maternity-services-for-pregnant-women/.
11. Nathaniel Kyere Bekoe. “False: Ibrahim Traoré Has Not Made Education Free from Primary to University Level,” Dubawa Ghana, August 26, 2025. https://ghana.dubawa.org/false-ibrahim-traore-has-not-made-education-free-from-primary-to-university-level/.
12. Editorial Team of Africa Confidential. “Cracks Appear in Traoré’s YouTube Persona,” Africa Confidential, May 2, 2025. https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/15467/cracks-appear-in-traore%27s-youtube-persona.
13. Benjamin König. “Burkina Faso: Le Capitaine Ibrahim Traoré Publie sur les Réseaux Sociaux une Liste Noire d’Ennemis de l’Intérieur ou de l’Extérieur,” L’Humanité, April 3, 2025. https://www.humanite.fr/monde/burkina-faso/burkina-faso-le-capitaine-ibrahim-traore-publie-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux-une-liste-noire-dennemis-de-linterieur-ou-de-lexterieur.
14. The Africa Dream (@theafricadream). “Solidarity with Traoré,” X (formerly Twitter), April 21, 2025. https://x.com/theafricadream/status/1914331282948886603.
15. U.S. Africa Command. Video: “Ibrahim Traoré Public Rally, 2025,” YouTube, April 4, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYjb6R489tM.
16. Nicholas Mwangi. “Hands Off AES: Solidarity Protests Sweep West Africa in Defense of Burkina Faso and Captain Traoré,” Peoples Dispatch. April 30, 2025. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/04/30/hands-off-aes-solidarity-protests-sweep-west-africa-in-defense-of-burkina-faso-and-captain-traore/.
17. Albert Ferguson. “Rastafarians Declare Solidarity with Burkina Faso Leader,” Jamaica Gleaner. May 1, 2025. https://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20250501/rastafarians-declare-solidarity-burkina-faso-leader.
18. Ana Vračar. “Sahel Diaspora Groups Rally in Support of AES and to Challenge Europe’s Media Colonialism,” Peoples Dispatch, April 18, 2025. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/04/18/sahel-diaspora-groups-rally-in-support-of-aes-and-to-challenge-europes-media-colonialism/.
19. See Note 12.
20. Frederic Tendeng. “Uncertainty in Burkina Faso: Captain Traoré’s Disappearance Fuels Coup Rumors,” GambiaJ, June 18, 2024. https://gambiaj.com/uncertainty-in-burkina-faso-captain-traores-disappearance-fuels-coup-rumors/.
21. Pedro Stropasolas. “Burkina Faso’s Government Announces Another Coup Attempt Dismantlement,” Brasil de Fato, April 24, 2025. https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2025/04/24/burkina-fasos-government-announces-another-coup-attempt-dismantlement/.
22. James Courtright. “Repression and War in Burkina Faso,” Institute of Current World Affairs (ICWA), December 22, 2023. https://www.icwa.org/repression-war-burkina-faso/.
23. See Note 12.
24. See Note 12.
25. See Note 12..
26. Editorial Team of Agence-France Presse. “Burkina Faso Leader Warns of Foreign Interference,” Arab News Pakistan, April 25, 2025. https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2598470/world.
27. Editorial Team of Sahara Reporters. “Breaking: DSS Arrests Edo-Based Activist, Five Others over Planned Rally for Burkina Faso’s Leader,” Sahara Reporters, May 3, 2025. https://saharareporters.com/2025/05/03/breaking-dss-arrests-edo-based-activist-five-others-over-planned-rally-burkina-fasos.
28. Ibid.
29. Enoch Randy Aikins. “Can Ibrahim Traoré Turn the Fortunes of Burkina Faso Around?”, ISS Futures Blog, March 13, 2025. https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2025/Can-Ibrahim-Traore-turn-the-fortunes-of-Burkina-Faso-around.