Introduction

The Ethiopian government has faced serious problems in Ethiopia’s most influential regions – Tigray, Oromia, and now Amhara. A year has passed since the fighting between the Amhara ethnic militia, called Fano, and the federal defense force continued, causing immense suffering and devastation. Domestic initiatives for conflict resolution and peacebuilding hardly brighten the prospects for peace in the region. The reason is the inability to mobilize political capital and resources to persuade the warring parties to engage in peace negotiations. Resolving the conflict in the Amhara region means searching for substitute foreign mediators and assisting domestic efforts to offer supplementary and parallel peace processes, which requires substantial efforts and resources.

Most Ethiopians supported Abiy Ahmed’s ascent to power in 2018 and the opening of the political space. The Nobel Peace Prize and the global community’s support reinforced his initial popularity. However, initial expectations and support for a successful political transition have faded. The transition did not resolve ethnic tensions, political and resource-related grievances, and internal border disputes that had already erupted before 2018. As a result, there has been a tangle of crises that threaten the country’s stability compared to the pre-2018 period. After the war in the Tigray region culminated in the Pretoria agreement, signed between the federal government and TPLF on November 2, 2022, Ethiopia was again enmeshed in an internal armed struggle; this time, the Amhara region, the second most-populous region in the country, witnessed the onset of a new conflict. Armed groups known as Amhara Fano control much of the rural areas of the region.

The rallying point for Amhara nationalism, among other things, is related to widespread resentment of the post-1991 political system, which was believed to have been built around the image of Amhara as an oppressor of other nations and nationalities in Ethiopia, blaming Amhara for historical injustices.1 The unmet expectations of the Amhara elites that the post-2018 leadership would correct such “Amhara domination discourse,” accompanied by a recent feeling of exclusion from the Pretoria agreement and the dissolution of the Amhara special police, were among the triggers and drivers of the conflict in the Amhara region.2

Domestic Efforts for Negotiated Peace and their Flaws

There is a growing optimism for resolving conflicts through domestic initiatives to foster dialogue and peace. The federal government established the National Dialogue Commission (NDC) in December 2021, whose primary objective is “facilitating consultation between and among the various segments of the society by identifying the root causes of the difference on fundamental national issues and identifying the topics on which the discussion will take place.”3 Understandably, the NDC was established to deal with the problems nationwide, including the Amhara elites raising questions antithetical to the post-1991 political discourse and its institutions.4 The Amhara regional government and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) organized a series of “peace conferences” from June 24 to 25, 2024. It was subsequently reported that a peace committee called the “Amhara Peace Council” had been established, aiming to facilitate negotiations between the Fano forces and the government.

The NDC was established during a violent conflict in the Tigray region, and facilitated engagements with rebel-controlled areas in the Oromia region. It performs a great deal of work in agenda-setting, and recruiting dialogue participants in all regions of the country (except Amhara and Tigray). By now, there is no enabling environment for the NDC to pursue its activities in the Amhara region, as violent confrontations between the ENDF and Fano forces have ravaged the latter.

Despite significant efforts, the NDC faces criticisms as it excludes forces that oppose the government and does not involve opposition parties and rebel factions within the country. The caucus of eleven opposition parties accuses the Commission of “political bias” and “failure to ensure inclusivity,” also noting that it will fail to address the root causes of the political crisis in Ethiopia.5 Other political parties, such as ONLF, the Enat Party, and the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party, withdrew from the dialogue process.

After a month of calling for a ceasefire and negotiations, the Amhara Regional Peace Council announced that peace settlements had not progressed. It stated that “the deep-rooted mistrust between the federal government and the Fano forces fighting in the Amhara region pose a challenge to our efforts to achieve peace.”6 Both institutions failed to bring about a possibility of peace in the Amhara region, even though they urged the two warring parties to reach a peaceful agreement. Neither the NDC nor the Amhara Peace Council has the mandate to mediate between conflicting parties, nor do they possess the political capital to pressure the government and the Fano forces to de-escalate the conflict. They can only encourage these groups to engage in the national dialogue through statements to the state media. There were initial hopes that the two institutions could exert pressure on the government and Fano fighters in the Amhara region. However, it has only been able to encourage those fighting groups to come to terms in the national dialogue.

Conclusion

Given Ethiopia’s reality of political crises and ethnic cleavages, it is clear that the country must establish a new social contract through an inclusive and participatory national dialogue process. This approach is relevant to Festus Aubyn’s thinking that has emphasized the idea of “national ownership”—a nationally led peace process for effective peacebuilding initiatives that bridge the African and international peacebuilding discourses.7 The role of the NDC and related initiatives is irreplaceable in this regard. However, dissenting voices from the opposition assert that the NDC and other initiatives do not solve the conflicts at the macro level, thus, undermining their leading role in conflict resolution. Nonetheless, they can serve in a supplementary and parallel peace process approach to complement the central negotiations and dialogue. The position of the two conflict parties, Fano fighters and the government, indicates that the conflict will persist, and the people of the region will continue to endure immense suffering. Since Ethiopia lacks adequate political capital and resources to bring the warring parties to the bargaining table, the international community should take on a more supportive and constructive mediating role.

 

Endnotes

  1. Addis Standard. 2024. The Opposition Party’s Caucus Accuses NDC of Political Bias and Failure to Ensure Inclusivity.https://addisstandard.com/caucus-of-opposition-parties-accuses-national-dialogue-commission-of-political-bias-and-failure-to-ensure-inclusivity/.

  2. Aubyn, Festus K. 2021. “An Overview of Recent Trends in African Scholarly Writing on Peacebuilding.” In Researching Peacebuilding in Africa: Reflections on Theory, Fieldwork and Context, edited by Ismail Rashid and Abdel Wahab Niang, 15–37. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

  3. Dereje Feyisa. 2023. Epistemological Debates and Ideological Fault-lines in Ethiopia. Rift Valley Institute Peace Research Facility.

  4. Ethiopian Reporter. 2024. “The Lack of Trust Between the Two Forces Involved in the Conflict Has Become a Significant Challenge.” https://www.ethiopianreporter.com/133399/.

  5. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 2021. Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 1265/2021. Addis Ababa: Federal Negarit Gazette.

  6. International Crisis Group. 2023. Ethiopia’s Ominous New War in Amhara (Africa Briefing No. 194). November 16. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara.

  7. Workneh, Yetnebersh A. 2024. “Reactions to Nation-Building: The Roots of Amhara Nationalism in Ethiopia.” Cogent Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2286661.

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