The views expressed here emanated from a panel discussion on “Trendlines and Transformations in African Democratic Governance: Lessons for US-Africa Relations,” held at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington DC., on November 13, 2024.

In December 2018, Sudan witnessed the third democratic uprising in its post-independent history. Led by a broad coalition of professional associations and opposition parties, and joined by young activists organized in neighborhood committees, the uprising succeeded in toppling the three decades-long dictator Omar Al-Bashir,1 and promised to usher in a new era—one where the long-awaited project of democratic peacebuilding could be realized. Given the gloomy picture of global democratic backsliding in the last two decades,2 and the frustrating fate of the Arab/North Africa Spring,3 Sudan’s revolution was celebrated in western policy and academic circles as a source of hope and inspiration. Coupled with the leadership change in neighboring Ethiopia, the uprising in Sudan was considered by American national security strategists as further evidence of Africa’s promising democratic future.4

All panelists from the Trendlines and Transformations in African Democratic Governance: Lessons for US-Africa Relations policy dialogue. Photo by Wilson Center.

By late 2021, it became clear that similar to their misjudgment on Ethiopia’s new leadership,5 these strategists were mistaken regarding Sudan’s immediate future post-revolution. In October 2021, Sudan’s military, led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and his deputy and the head of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti), overthrew the transitional government and detained most of its civilian members. The alliance between the two generals did not last for long. In April 2023, the early skirmishes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF turned into a full-fledged military confrontation in the capital city of Khartoum, and other regions. Against this background, it was evident that both the Trump and Biden administration failed not only to understand the challenges of Sudan’s democratic peacebuilding, but also to act in support of the civilian transitional government,

Given its history of civil wars, military coups, and failed democratic uprisings, post-Bashir Sudan was in a dire need for a trilateral transition from war to peace, from dictatorship to democracy, and from an economy benefitting a few to one that integrates its marginalized peripheries. While welcoming the overthrow of the Al-Bashir regime, which was subject to American and international sanctions for more than two decades, it took the first Trump administration one year to remove Sudan from the State Sponsor of Terrorism List (SSTL) and unlock economic opportunities for the transitional government, including debt relief for Sudan through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Trump’s ‘transactional’ foreign policy6 meant that Sudan had to offer something in return:  payment compensations for families of American victims of terrorist attacks involving persons hosted by Khartoum in the mid-1990s, and, more problematically, normalizing relations with Israel. The Biden administration was interested in supporting the transitional government, but, as admitted by former diplomats in the administration, it followed a ‘pragmatic’ approach,7 centered around accommodating Sudan’s military leaders and assuming that power-sharing is the magical solution to Sudan’s political crises.8  Worse still, while witnessing the dramatic humanitarian cost of the war since April 2023, the administration was not willing to put sufficient pressure on the regional powers fueling the conflict.

Among these regional powers, the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is particularly critical. The UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, had promised to provide US $3 billion to Sudan after the fall of Al-Bashir, providing half of this package to the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that assumed power after the fall of Al-Bashir, but ceased its support when the civilian transitional government was formed in August 2019. More consequential has been the Emirati support to the RSF in its military confrontation with the SAF. According to a report by the United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts on Sudan,9 the UAE’s supply of advanced weapons to the RSF had ‘massive impact on the balance of forces on the ground, both in Darfur and in other regions. Given their support to counter-revolutionary forces in other North African countries since 2011 and their increasing engagement in the Horn of Africa conflicts, the involvement of Washington’s Gulf allies, especially the UAE, in Sudan has exacerbated the challenges of democratic peacebuilding. The fact that the SAF had to restore its diplomatic relations with Iran to counterweigh the Emirati support to the RSF has further indicated that Sudan would remain dragged into wider regional tensions in an increasingly volatile Middle East.

The role of some African regional powers was no less problematic. In spite of the documented war crimes by the RSF, Hemedti was received by heads of states and governments in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala, Kigali and Pretoria. The early proposal of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for a no-fly zone and the deployment of regional forces was seen by the SAF as a total endorsement of the RSF’s position, and was met with a decision to suspend Sudan’s membership in the regional organization. By the time the departing Biden administration denied plans for the deployment of African peacekeeping forces,10 Sudan’s neighbors had become ambivalent about their ability to contribute to such forces. In light of these skepticisms around capacity and impartiality, the conflict in Sudan defies the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems,’ indicating a crisis in the regional diplomacy of the Horn of Africa.

Between American apathy and regional manipulation, many young Sudanese, including those who took to the streets to bring down a dictatorship six years ago, are disillusioned with the prospects of restoring democracy to their war-torn country. While some of them have joined the fighting against the RSF to protect state institutions as a condition for democratic transition,11 the prospects of this transition after the potential victory of the SAF is slim at best. The militarization of the political space, diffusion of civilian forces, and increasing popular distrust of these forces, would favor the SAF in any future post-war arrangement. For the time being, democratic peacebuilding in Sudan remains a distant dream.12

Endnotes

  1. Hassan, Mai, and Ahmad Kadouda. “Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator.” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019).
  2. Carothers, Thomas, and Benjamin Press. “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/20/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding.
  3. Masoud, Tarek. “The Arab Spring at 10: Kings or People?” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 1 (2021).
  4. Devermont, Judd, and Jon Temin. “Africa’s Democratic Moment?” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 4 (July/August 2019).
  5. Verhoeven, Harry, and Michael Woldemariam. “Who Lost Ethiopia? The Unmaking of an African Anchor State and US Foreign Policy.” Contemporary Security Policy 43, no. 4 (2022).
  6. Berridge, Willow, Justin Lynch, Raga Makawi, and Alex de Waal. Sudan’s Unfinished Democracy: The Promise and Betrayal of a People’s Revolution. London: Hurst Publishers, 2022.
  7. Feltman, Jeffrey. “Sudan Shows the General Can’t Be Trusted.” The Washington Post, April 18, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/18/sudans-generals-have-plunged-country-into-violence-they-cant-be-trusted.
  8. Knopf, Payton. “The Year(s) of Magical Thinking on Sudan.” Just Security, August 12, 2024. https://www.justsecurity.org/2024/08/12/the-years-of-magical-thinking-on-sudan.
  9. United Nations. UN Document. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/005/64/pdf/n2400564.pdf.
  10. Sudan Tribune. “US Envoy Denies Plans for African Peacekeeping Force.” October 8, 2024. https://www.sudantribune.com/article.
  11. Zaidan, Yasir. “Why Sudanese Democracy Activists Are Now Backing the Army.” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2025. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/03/why-sudanese-democracy-activists-are-now-backing-the-army.
  12. Abdelgadir, Amgad. “Visit by Ex-PM Hamdock Sparks Mass Demo in London.” Damanga Radio Online, November 2, 2024. https://www.damangaradio.com/article/visit-by-ex-pm-hamdock-sparks-mass-demo-in-london.
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