Africa remains the highest supplier of peacekeepers.¹ It is paradoxical that, while Nigeria has a strong global record for participating in international peacekeeping missions, the evidence suggests increasing failure in its domestic peace and security efforts. Security governance is weak and ineffective as the country continues to experience internal insecurity in all its geopolitical regions.² Every geopolitical zone in Nigeria experiences security problems. The South-South battles with oil politics and militancy.³ Farmer-herder conflict ravages North-Central Nigeria⁴, Boko Haram insurgency is active in the North-East,⁵ and the North-West is battling with banditry.6 The South-West is facing armed attacks, including kidnapping by bandits7, while Southeast Nigeria grapples with Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) agitation, communal conflicts, and farmer-herdsmen clashes, which continue to pose a serious security challenge to the region. IPOB agitation revolves around socio-political exclusion and marginalization of the region.8 This has given rise to complex security problems, among which is the concept of ‘unknown gunmen,’ associated with armed robbery, kidnapping, communal violence, and other forms of insecurity in the region.9 Unfortunately, the federal government has not been able to fully address this.

Security governance is the system of managing security systems, structures, intelligences, risks, and processes.10 In some contexts, the government deliberately deploys silence as discourse within the security system. Such silence is full of meaning and power, and power usually determines the order of discourse in socio-political settings.11The study conceptualizes institutional silence in the context of state – society relations,12 while the form of silence used within the context of discourse, also referred to as discursive silence,13 involves the deliberate use of silence to reinforce structural violence in ways that leverage state narratives and power. In the study, discursive silence incorporates the intersection of silence and discourse, stressing silence as a deliberate suppression of voice within insecurity discourse in order to construct ideology, enact meaning, shape interpretation, and maintain power dynamics in social relations. Jancsary asserts that silence is a stimulus whose response is not fixed, and so in an institution, it can be a deliberate act of transformation; although it can equally be used for suppression and concealment.14 One of the specific objectives of this essay examines residents of Eastern Nigeria’s perceptions, interpretations, and responses to the government’s strategic use of discursive silence in responding to the insecurity posed by IPOB militancy in the region. It also examines the impact of state institutional silence on the residents’ confidence and perception of government, including its implications for peacebuilding in the region. Lastly, the study provides actionable policy options for improving the government’s response to insecurity in the region.

Pervasive Insecurity Issues in Southeast Nigeria

Insecurity dynamics in the Southeast did not start with IPOB. Other insecurity-generating issues were already threatening the region prior to the emergence of IPOB in the year 2012.15 Such insecurity-inducing issues included political marginalization at the federal level, farmer-herder clashes, socio-economic exclusion, and inequality, among others. In reaction to this long-term insecurity, the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) emerged as the first post-civil war neo-Biafran separatist group in Southeast Nigeria,16 to express grievances of the Igbo of the region. The movement hinged its agitation against the federal government on negligence, socio-political exclusion, economic backwardness, and marginalization of the Igbo since the end of the civil war in 1970. My interviews with residents of the region conveyed strong feelings that the federal government has responded to their grievances with “silence,” and failed to demonstrate equity and justice in the distribution of democratic dividends since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999. Their responses also attributed the insecurity, socio-economic crisis, unemployment, and youth restiveness in the region to bad governance.

The current insecurity in the region has been fuelled by discontent among the youth and violent non-state actors (NSAs), who feel marginalized and oppressed. Their plight is worsened by brutality from the security agents, particularly when responding to protests. Instead of duly responding to and addressing insecurity incidents, such as protests organized by IPOB and farmer-herder clashes, the government has instrumentalized a mix of silence and militarized coercion in its response to the grievances of the youth.

Methodology

My fieldwork was based on quantitative and qualitative approaches, using questionnaires to collect data from residents of Anambra and Imo States in South-East, conducting in-depth interviews in Abuja, Imo and Anambra states, targeting key informants (senior security personnel, government officials, journalists, civil society actors, and policy analysts) with strategic knowledge of national security, governance, and media discourse on IPOB.

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) was held with several traditional rulers, clerics, Headmasters, Principals, Police officers, youth leaders, and former victims of kidnapping and IPOB uprising in Orlu, Imo State and Nnewi, Anambra State. FGD was organised to capture diverse and informed perspectives on IPOB militancy and the government’s deployed silence as a strategy for security governance in Southeast Nigeria. The FGD also involved transporters, traders, and civil society representatives with varying views on separatist movements, state response, and national unity.

Findings

During fieldwork, it was observed that many deserted homes, shops, business offices, schools, villages, and markets were observed across the case study states. Residents (artisans, bus drivers, and market sellers) lamented the losses they incurred every Monday as a result of the sit-at-home order. Some lamented the death of their loved ones who dared to violate the order, attempting to go to their farms, and the government was silent about it. Various socio-economic activities are paralyzed and adversely affected by the recurrent violent insecurity incidents therein. The residents considered the government’s non-response as silence on their grievances. This feeling of marginalization has been worsened by the perceived heavy-handed responses to the security challenges facing the region.  Many respondents expressed the view that the IPOB agitations meant nothing to the government, noting that “silence” accompanied by force is often deployed without the option of open dialogue on the grievances of the people. Some interpret this as a sign of government’s unwillingness to offer institutional justice and equity to the Igbo of Southeast Nigeria. Another source of grievance is the government’s refusal to release Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB leader who had been sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted for terrorism. This was widely interpreted as evidence of Igbo marginalization by the hegemonic ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, and Yoruba) controlling the federal government.

Research participants lamented that the Nigerian government’s discursive silence on Igbo presidency (which is one of the grievances of the IPOB agitation) was a sign of the federal government’s political exclusion and marginalization of the Igbos. They argued that the federal government has not allowed an Igbo presidency to emerge since the end of the civil war in 1970, and particularly after the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. They further argue that such institutional silence on this area is an instance of discursive silence and a mark of political exclusion, maintaining that Igbo, as one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, ought to be given the same opportunity for the sake of equity and justice. This political marginalization of the Igbo is one of the major factors driving the IPOB agitation. Therefore, IPOB agitation can be termed an identity-based agitation, resulting from a certain shared historical mentality, memory, mutual cultural heritage, and common destiny; and as such, the federal government should not exhibit discursive silence about it.

The research respondents equally observed that government communication on security responses is not inclusive, is often delayed, and conveys the impression that citizens’ safety is not prioritized by the state. Many of the respondents observed that the government’s responses have not properly addressed the underlying drivers of insecurity such as political marginalization, democratic inefficiency, socio-economic imbalances, and the like in Southeast. Most of them referred to the conviction and jailing of IPOB leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, who they consider an Igbo freedom fighter, as unjust—particularly when some ethnic militia and insurgent leaders from other ethnic groups and regions did not receive a similar treatment.

They compare the jailing of Kanu, with the freedom enjoyed by other ethnic militants, Asari Dokubo, Tom Polo, and Ateke Tom of the Niger Delta (Rivers and Bayelsa precisely), Sunday Igboho (Sunday Adeyemo), and Ganiyu Adams of the Southwest region. Many research respondents argued that militants from other ethnic groups ought to be imprisoned too, if the government is to follow the logic that freedom fighters in Nigeria be treated equally by the country’s laws.17

Notably, 88.4% of the respondents indicated that government communication on insecurity is often top-down, delayed, and/or militarized. In this case, the government’s discursive silence is seen as part of a security architecture designed to suppress IPOB or any pan-Igbo agitation for self-determination. The silence creates fear and tension, exacerbating the alienation of local people from federal power. If security governance were based on open engagement with the people and their grievances, the citizens would not feel abandoned by the government. Thus, when the citizens see no solution from the government’s security responses, the state loses its legitimacy, further fueling insecurity.

According to many of the research participants, security operatives always repress the IPOB agitators and those suspected to be their sympathizers, framing security response missions as threats to the state, even resorting to the use of force. Some of the people have gone as far as seeking other sources of non-state security provision. One of the respondents, a traditional ruler and chief priest of a deity, though highly educated and politically enlightened, attested to his increasing patronage of local, traditional religious practices since the escalation of insecurity in the region. In his words, “…the gods and my ancestors cannot leave me to ruins, like the government does; believing in their capacity to save me, I turned to them, thereby practicing the African Traditional Religion.” Other respondents expressed the view that the impact of the state’s responses to insecurity has included crippling of economic activities, migration, and the death of numerous residents, including some traditional rulers.

The problem of insecurity in Southeast Nigeria

Addressing the problem of insecurity in Southeast Nigeria requires a dialogic approach to IPOB agitation. Rethinking government response strategies should reflect on existing policy documents such as the National Security Strategy, Federal Republic of Nigeria, December 2019. Extracts from this document articulate some of its objectives as follows: “Our national social security focus will be to: Promote social stability through national unity, …social justice, equality, equitable representation, … inclusiveness, equal opportunities, and…eliminate all forms of discrimination, favoritism and preferential treatment in our national life…” (p. 45). From this document, it can be argued that the government should address the drivers of social instability, and explore ways of resolving them in the Southeast.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has shown that in terms of operation or practice, silence is leveraged by the government to remain non-responsive to the insecurity in the Southeast. It utilizes discursive silence to conceal its unwillingness to deal with core drivers of insecurity in the region, thereby ignoring the plights of the people. This is a deliberate silent action that it explores to construct and sustain suppression of indigenous knowledge of resistance to its dominant power used to control the dynamics of insecurity in Southeast. his is made manifest in security discourse, whereby the matters are silenced strategically by the government. In most cases, the discourse is deliberately made selective, followed by selective response to the security issues confronting the people. The foregoing should not be the case.

Residents18, especially traditional rulers, complained of non-inclusivity in security initiatives, maintaining that every community is under the leadership of a traditional ruler. Government’s failure to fully integrate this set of local custodians is seen as an aspect of the politics of silence. As such, this study stresses the role of local communities in security governance, advocating for a change in the current discursive strategy by adopting participatory peacebuilding frameworks where local voices are integrated into security policies and conflict resolution strategies. This will strengthen collaboration between security forces and local inhabitants who are conversant with the terrain of their environment.

Dialogic and deliberative approaches are more viable mechanisms for realizing a form of security governance that is beneficial to Southeast Nigeria. Through such mechanisms, peace can be restored in the region. International multilateral organisations should develop joint security information-sharing platforms that track cross-border (with Eastern Nigeria and neighboring regions) conflicts and facilitate collaborative peacekeeping interventions.

Furthermore, institutional discursive approaches that involve meaningful stakeholder collaboration between the state, political leaders, traditional rulers, community youths, religious leaders, national and international security agencies, and civil organizations, can help address the high spate of insecurity in the Southeast region of Nigeria. Peacebuilding in Southeast Nigeria requires local, state, and federal de-radicalization of IPOB militancy, as well as participatory engagements with local communities, dialogue with the IPOB agitators, and security actors. State coercion, militarization, and delayed response can hardly resolve insecurity issues generated by IPOB agitation. The region will be more peaceful if there is equity, justice, transparency, and accountability in state and local security governance. Since peacebuilding is anchored on dialogue, applying this principle of dialogue, and initiating a deliberation between the IPOB agitators and stakeholders like the federal government of Nigeria, Southeast state governments, security agencies, civil society organizations, religious leaders, community heads, traditional rulers, investors, and business owners will bear much fruit.

Endnotes

  1. Federal Republic of Nigeria. National security strategy. Office of the National Security. 2019. Accessed May 21, 2026. https://share.google/OFlkLMrZigIzEAxSr
  2. Madueke, Onyedikachi. Why should we worry about Nigeria’s Fragile Security? The Political Quarterly, 2025. 19(1), pp. 10-117. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923x.70010
  3. Njoku, Chukwudi G. Militarized yet Under-Policed: The Dilemma of Conflict Early Response in the Niger Delta. Kujenga-Amani, 2026.kujenga-amani.ssrc.org.z
  4. Omiunu, F. I. and Ezirim, G. E. Separatist Agitations and Human Security in South-East, Nigeria, 2021-2023. South East Political Science Review, 2025, 10(1), pp. 71-91.
  5. Abubakar, Tafida A. and Amurtiya, Michael. “Boko-Haram Insurgency and Rural Livelihood  Dilemma: Implication for Sustainable Development in North-East Nigeria.”Ekorozwoju, 2023, vol. 18, no.1, pp. 216–25, https://doi.org/10.35784/pe.2023.1.23; United Nations. Africa Renewal. Online, Accessed 19 June, 2026 from             https://africarenewal.un.org/en/taxonomy/term/300;
  6. Schouten, Peer and Barnett, James. “Divided, they rule? The emerging landscape of banditry in   northwest Nigeria,” DIIS Report, 27 August 2025, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/divided-they-rule-the-emerging-landscape-of-banditry-   in-northwest-nigeria;
  7. Ojewale, Oluwole. “Northwest Nigeria Has a Banditry Problem. What’s Driving It?” IPI Global Observatory, May 22, 2024; UNIDIR. “Banditry in Nigeria’s North West: Key Findings,” 16   December 2024, https://unidir.org/publication/banditry-in-nigerias-north-west-key-findings/
  8. Chukwuokoro, Ifeyinwa. Cartoons in Symbolic Representations of Silent Connivance among   Nigerian Stakeholders in Increasing Insecurity: Multimodal Analysis. International  Journal of Scientific Research in Humanities and Social Sciences (IJSRHSS), 2024, 1(1), pp. 97-112. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32628/IJSRSSH242559
  9. Sahara Reporters. “IPOB Says it has Identities of Politicians, Unknown Gunmen behind Killings in Imo,” Sahara Reporters, 20 May, 2022. https://web.facebook.com/ReportYourself/posts/ipob-says-it-has-identities-of-politicians- unknown-gunmen-behind-killings-in-imo/10158738729322703/?_rdc=1&_rdr.
  10. Liao, Danzi. Security Governance: An Alternative Paradigm. 2011. https://www.ijssh.org/papers/62-H075.pdf
  11. Slemon, Allie. Absences and Silences in Critical Discourse Analysis: Methodological Reflections. 2025.
  12. Slemon, Allie. Absences and Silences in Critical Discourse Analysis: Methodological Reflections. 2025. https://www.ijssh.org/papers/62-H075.pdf
  13. Slemon, Allie. Absences and Silences in Critical Discourse Analysis: Methodological Reflections. 2025. https://www.ijssh.org/papers/62-H075.pdf
  14. Jancsary, Dennis C. The Role of Deliberate Silence in Institutional Change. https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3196724/1/silence_in_institutional_change_AAM.pdf
  15. Ojo, John S. Transforming Pacifists into Warmongers? Separatist Movement, State Repression,       and the Politics of Framing Terrorism in Nigeria: Evidence from IPOB and Yoruba Nation’s Freedom Frontiers, Journal of Applied Security Research, 2023 19 (3), pp. 377-412.DOI: 10.1080/19361610.2023.2189867
  16. Onuoha, Godwin. The Presence of the Past: Youth, Memory Making and the Politics of Self-Determination in Southeastern Nigeria. Ethnic and Racial Studies, . 2013. 36 (12): 2182–99. doi:10.1080/01419870.2012.699087.
  17. Ibid.
  18. The nature of the research necessitated the importance of negotiating trust and confidentiality among the respondents for reassurance of safety. Many responded with precaution, mindful of their affiliation, position, and safety. Yet, such situations do not invalidate the findings but obviously highlight practical conditions for knowledge production in insecurity discourse.